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In the 21st century, international humanitarian response remains encumbered by serious gaps and
unpreparedness. The inefficacies stem from longstanding organizational challenges in the areas of
accountability, predictability, and reliability. Humanitarian reform comprises three pillars: the cluster
approach, timely financing, and strategic leadership. Cluster coordination, introduced in the 2005
Humanitarian Response Review commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
holds great significance because it calls for leadership in specific need areas and for the development of
partnerships. This thesis aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on improving humanitarian
processes to better meet the needs of affected populations by examining whether cluster coordination builds
effective responses and whether a different actor may temporarily provide governmental services when the
government is absent. The cases of Haiti and Myanmar, which illustrate different successes and challenges of
the cluster approach, identify four fundamental features of disaster coordination and response. These features
demonstrate that in an environment of trust and openness, strong cluster coordination can empower
leadership and help leverage the full range of existing capacities, resulting in an effective response.
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ABSTRACT 
 
HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION AND RESPONSE: 
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS IN FACE OF NATURAL DISASTERS 
Julia Wong 
Dr. Eileen Doherty-Sil 
 
In the 21st century, international humanitarian response remains encumbered by 
serious gaps and unpreparedness. The inefficacies stem from longstanding organizational 
challenges in the areas of accountability, predictability, and reliability. Humanitarian 
reform comprises three pillars: the cluster approach, timely financing, and strategic 
leadership. Cluster coordination, introduced in the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review 
commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, holds great 
significance because it calls for leadership in specific need areas and for the development 
of partnerships. This thesis aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on 
improving humanitarian processes to better meet the needs of affected populations by 
examining whether cluster coordination builds effective responses and whether a 
different actor may temporarily provide governmental services when the government is 
absent.  The cases of Haiti and Myanmar, which illustrate different successes and 
challenges of the cluster approach, identify four fundamental features of disaster 
coordination and response.  These features demonstrate that in an environment of trust 
and openness, strong cluster coordination can empower leadership and help leverage the 
full range of existing capacities, resulting in an effective response.  
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HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
 On January 12, 2010 at 16:53 local time, a 7.0 MW earthquake decimated 222,750 
lives and injured 300,572 people, affecting an estimated 3 million Haitians and crippling 
the country’s economic heart Port-au-Prince with the significant infrastructural damage.   
Displacement, disease, food insecurity, psychosocial trauma, ruined livelihoods, and 
arrested education overwhelmed the ravaged city in the earthquake’s aftermath.  Twelve 
months into the struggle, Port-au-Prince remained a tent city squatting in the vast rubble 
remains due to stalled reconstruction.  Despite the technological and scientific 
advancements of the 21st century, the global community has yet to develop the 
mechanisms to respond strategically and proficiently to natural disasters.  Given the 
persistent nature of certain natural disasters, such as floods in Pakistan and droughts in 
Kenya, and growing climatic fluctuations engendering large-scale calamities, it is 
imperative for the United Nations (UN), governments, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to develop flexible coordination and response plans that enable 
humanitarian actors to properly meet the needs of the affected population.  Currently, 
international humanitarian coordination faces serious organizational challenges, which in 
turn encumber humanitarian response and lead to unpreparedness and serious gaps in 
service provision.  These inefficiencies stem from longstanding systemic challenges—a 
lack of strategic leadership, a multitude of international agents attempting to fulfill their 
own mandates and missions, and the difficulty of holding agents accountable due to the 
voluntary nature of humanitarian response.   
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This work aims to shed light on these systemic challenges in the humanitarian 
sphere and to analyze the effectiveness of the novel cluster approach, introduced in the 
2005 Humanitarian Response Review commissioned by the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  Cluster coordination extends the assumption that 
effective collaboration among the UN, governments, and NGOs leads to an effective 
humanitarian response, and the cluster approach attempts to redress significant capacity 
gaps by bolstering leadership across the different areas of response or “clusters.”  The 
success of the cluster approach depends on whether it implements the factors that lead to 
effective humanitarian responses.  Analyzing the specific factors that contribute to a 
response’s effectiveness, this study examines in detail the international response to the 
2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and focuses on cluster 
coordination in the areas of nutrition and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). 
 
CASE SELECTION 
The selection of Haiti and Myanmar as primary case studies is based primarily on 
their contextual similarity, since both countries encountered natural disasters of 
comparable scale and scope and rolled out cluster coordination.1  While Haiti is the 
poorest nation in the western hemisphere, Myanmar is one of the most impoverished 
nations in Asia with the Government of the Union of Myanmar (GoUM) controlling the 
wealth of natural resources.  Also, both countries’ history of colonialism and political 
instability create heightened challenges for international aid.   The delicate political 
situation in Haiti and Myanmar at times impedes the entry and delivery of foreign aid.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 To concretely assess the current state of humanitarian coordination and response, one needs to 
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Despite their contextual similarity, important differences exist between Haiti and 
Myanmar.  Namely, one finds a stark difference in the political response to the natural 
disasters.  In Haiti, the collapse of government infrastructure led to the postponement of 
the country’s legislative elections from February 28, 2010 to November 28, 2010.  The 
third democratic election to occur in Haiti, it transpired belatedly and in the context of 
growing international pressure over the country’s instability.  In Myanmar, on the other 
hand, the military junta exerted a domineering hand in carrying out the nationwide 
constitutional referendum at the cost of the disaster victims barely a week following 
Cyclone Nargis.  A range of egregious actions—diverting resources for the victims 
toward the referendum and evicting refugees to convert shelters into polling stations, 
among other transgressions—raised outcries against the hollow democratic agenda of the 
junta.  This marked difference presents another dimension with which to compare Haiti 
and Myanmar: the presence or absence of a strong government and its implications for a 
country devastated by a natural disaster.  The contrasting accounts across countries and 
across clusters shed insight on the variability of the cluster approach, its effectiveness, 
and the roles of the international agencies, states, and NGOs in humanitarian response. 
 
SYNOPSIS 
The organization of this thesis in seven chapters presents a holistic view of 
international humanitarian coordination and response, the cluster approach, and its 
deployment and effectiveness.  The first chapter describes the relevance of humanitarian 
coordination and response in international policy and in academia and briefly introduces 
the selection of Haiti and Myanmar as case studies.  Chapter Two lays out two 
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hypotheses regarding effective humanitarian response and explicates the research 
approach.  Following an overview of the humanitarian landscape and its evolution across 
time in Chapter Three, Chapter Four explores the literature examining the role of NGOs, 
which yields insight on the second hypothesis and the interplay among international 
agencies, states, and NGOs.  Next, Chapter Five presents the cluster approach as rolled 
out in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters in Haiti and in Myanmar, and Chapter Six 
compares the two case studies.  Finally, Chapter Seven consolidates the analysis and calls 
for greater participation and integration of NGOs, government, and civil society in the 
deliberative process of the UN, which holds potential as the primary means to improved 
humanitarian coordination and humanitarian response.  The cases of Haiti and Myanmar, 
which illustrate different successes and challenges of the cluster approach, identify four 
fundamental features of disaster coordination and response.  These features demonstrate 
that in an environment of trust and openness, strong cluster coordination can empower 






HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Two hypotheses respond to the inquiries mentioned above: 
Hypothesis 1: The cluster approach, which has its basis in the argument that 
coordination among the different humanitarian actors is essential to effective 
humanitarian response, helps to surmount the systemic challenges impeding effective 
humanitarian response.  
This hypothesis draws upon the disciplines of organizational theory and 
management.  At the core of this idea, capitalizing on the various actors’ strengths 
through collaborative partnerships is integral because it allows dynamic synergies to 
develop.  Although it may be possible for independent, diverse, and uncoordinated actors 
to deliver aid, the humanitarian response will likely be disorganized and duplicative.  A 
framework for collaboration is thus necessary, and strong partnerships among 
international agencies, states, and NGOs will facilitate a more effective humanitarian 
response. 
  In order to test this hypothesis, one must define the roles of each actor.  The 
following roles are accorded by a strengths-based approach so that the expertise of the 
different actors may be harnessed.  The UN should execute its role as an all-around 
expert on coordination and response, training personnel both internationally and locally 
to deliver aid in the most effective ways.  It presides over cluster meetings as a neutral 
agent, mitigating conflicts among the different parties.  The UN also shoulders the 
responsibility of preparing comprehensive reports and assessments, keeping global 
stakeholders appraised of the situation on the ground.  It acts as the communication hub 
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and informs the general public of the still existing needs.  In this way, the UN helps the 
victims raise funds for necessities and fulfills its mandate.  Working alongside the UN, 
the government maintains the situation on the ground, tying together response efforts on a 
national level.  The government raises public morale through its broadcasts and 
communication, directing its citizens to relief stations and alerting them of any new 
developments.  Also, the government may use its preexisting understanding of the 
national terrain, its manpower through its public servants, and its network of national and 
local NGOs and corporations to lead the relief effort.  Ultimately, the government has the 
greatest impetus to see the country return to normalcy, so it is responsible for sustaining 
the response and serves as the provider of last resort on a national level.  In addition, 
there are the many international, national, and local NGOs.  All three have field expertise, 
and each has different relationships with the various stakeholders.  Often, the national 
and local NGOs are the best equipped to deliver aid because of their knowledge of the 
local language, politics, culture, and norms.  Altogether, the UN agencies, states, and 
NGOs offer unique expertise and capacities that should be leveraged. 
Hypothesis 2:  In the absence of a working host government, a robust 
international NGO or agency may be able to administer government functions 
temporarily.  The humanitarian response remains incumbent upon the national 
government—and, to a lesser extent, local NGOs—to reinstitute their services. 
This hypothesis suggests that a robust international NGO or agency can step in to 
temporarily administer governmental functions in the wake of a crisis, but the 
government must be reinstated for the long-term viability of the response plan.  Studying 
the Haiti earthquake, which decimated the government’s ability to provide for its citizens, 
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offers an instructive example for assessing the various actors’ roles and testing whether 
successful humanitarian aid can be achieved in the absence of a functioning state.  
Myanmar presents a different but equally compelling case in which the government 
rebuffed international assistance at the onset of the disaster, but eventually opened its 
borders.   
In order to test these two hypotheses, I draw on both quantitative and qualitative 
data from comprehensive country reports prepared by an array of actors from the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to 
the governments and the Global Public Policy Institute and Groupe Urgence 
Réhabilitation Développement (GPPI-URD).2  Specifically, these include IASC’s 
Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti;3 UNICEF’s Children in Haiti: One Year 
After—The Long Road from Relief to Recovery issue; Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action’s (ALNAP) Haiti Earthquake 
Response: Context Analysis, Post-Nargis Joint Assessment, and the ensuing Post-Nargis 
Periodic Reviews; GPPI-URD’s Second Phase Cluster Approach Evaluation; OCHA’s 
Flash Appeals; and news reports from Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN).  
These country reports provide clear ground assessments using similar criteria for 
analyzing the responses in Haiti and Myanmar.   
First, this research examines the effectiveness of the international humanitarian 
response in Haiti and Myanmar.  I measure effectiveness on a number of dimensions 
based on UN evaluation methodologies:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 GPPI-URD consists of two groups independent from the UN. 
3 The report was written six months after the Haiti earthquake following a request by the 
Principals of the IASC at a meeting on May 6, 2010. 
 	  
8	  
• Predictability and accountability of leadership and ownership 
• Cohesiveness in partnerships 
• Impact on affected populations vis-à-vis engagement and outstanding 
gaps.   
Each of these three indicators is core to UN evaluation methodologies, and for the sake of 
completeness, this thesis discusses all three indicators and conducts a cross-country and 
cross-cluster comparison using a straightforward three-level classification system.  
Second, because the core focus of this thesis centers on the role of partnerships in 
affecting overall outcomes, the significance of global partnerships among international 
agencies, governments, and NGOs will be assessed in further detail.  My hypotheses and 
the core of my analysis treat cohesiveness of partnerships not simply as a measure of 
effectiveness (that is, I do not assume cohesiveness is automatically an indication of 
effectiveness).  Rather, I examine the underlying logic by which that cohesiveness 
impacts overall aid effectiveness. Particular attention will be devoted to instances of 
partnerships that emerged in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters in Haiti and Myanmar, 
and these will be compared against situations in which actors acted independently.  
Interviews with humanitarian practitioners provide stakeholder input and infuse a more 
in-depth perspective into collaborative global partnerships. 
Third, the research will assess the various actors’ roles and responsibilities in the 
respective cases of Haiti and Myanmar.  NGOs and international agencies such as the UN 
have developed their capacity through better organization and greater experience.  The 
role of NGOs has also evolved due to increasingly collaborative partnerships among the 
UN, governments, and NGOs—particularly local and national NGOs.  This leads to the 
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question, “Could recovery be achieved efficiently without an existing government 
infrastructure?”  Particularly, NGOs’ ability to function within the international 
framework will be examined through the varying cluster performance in Haiti and 
Myanmar in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters.4  Also, various lessons will be drawn 
from the Myanmar and Haiti experiences to determine whether or not the presence of a 
government is vital to a country’s recovery.  Furthermore, the selected body of 
illustrative material on global governance and NGOs, together with reports from UN 
agencies and independent organizations, provides a variety of perspectives on 
international agencies, NGOs, and states as viable partners and impactful actors. 
The study of the three aforementioned points of focus—three indicators of 
effectiveness, role of partnerships, and roles of humanitarian actors—will shed light on 
whether strong partnerships among humanitarian actors contribute to an effective 
humanitarian response and whether sustained efficacy of a humanitarian response 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The cluster areas span a broad range of needs, from agriculture, food aid, early recovery, 





BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID 
 
Moving Forward from Rwanda, 1994 
Over the past four decades, the number of man-made and natural disasters has 
increased steadily, as reported in a study released at the May 1994 World Conference on 
Natural Disaster Reduction.  “More than 30 million people in 29 countries” needed 
emergency assistance in mid-1994 (Encyclopedia of the Nations).  This growth in the 
number of disasters is paralleled by an increase in international humanitarian aid activity 
in the 1990s, expressly evident in Rwanda during the Great Lakes refugee crisis of April 
1994.  The exodus of over two million Rwandans, mainly ethnic Hutus fleeing from the 
Tutsis, to neighboring African countries in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide 
quickly garnered international attention, and over two hundred national and international 
NGOs poured into Kigali, the capital of Rwanda (Renzaho 5).  Despite the impressive 
influx of aid, the NGOs were unable to harness and deploy their resources and expertise 
effectively.  In fact, aid delivery was tantamount to a catastrophe in and of itself.   
Numerous NGO and donor evaluations reflect upon the humanitarian response 
with heavy criticism toward the exploitation, imperialism, and failure of aid programs.  
Firstly, stabilization programs remained a relatively underdeveloped concept with which 
many newer NGOs had little expertise and no experience, particularly in implementation.  
Many components had to be taken into consideration, including rapid response to enable 
day-to-day functioning, plans for longer-term development, and local perspectives.  
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Certain NGOs acted with naiveté, initiating ill-informed programs with the assumption 
that they knew the best course of action for the local populace without taking into 
consideration the larger political context (Renzaho 9).  Secondly, NGOs charged with 
zealousness in their humanitarian mission barreled forward in an uncoordinated fashion.  
This inadvertently led to a duplication of aid efforts in certain areas, leaving other needs 
unattended to.  Thirdly, the lack of coordination further exacerbated the crisis because 
inter-NGO competition for limited local resources created hyperinflation, and power-
hungry local leaders manipulated goods in refugee camps to further their political 
ambitions. 
 
International Standards and Guidelines 
Following the Rwanda crisis, international agencies and NGOs realized the great 
necessity to reinvent the humanitarian aid system beginning with the development of 
international standards and operational guidelines.  They duly attributed the catastrophic 
response in Rwanda to the lack of shared technical guidelines.  Under the guidance of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, six networks of NGOs developed 
the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
NGOs in Disaster Relief, and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response 
adopted the Code of Conduct in 1994.  The primary principle rests upon the humanitarian 
imperative—all human beings are entitled to humanitarian aid.  The following standards 
demand impartiality, political and religious neutrality, coordination between NGOs, 
respect toward beneficiaries and local customs, inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, 
accountability, and professionalism.  The Code of Conduct introduces two core concepts 
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in emergency response.  First, these standards propel agencies and NGOs to move away 
from the imperialist model of aid toward a system that empowers the beneficiaries to 
rebuild their community and a system in which all stakeholders have a voice in the 
process.  Second, the principle of accountability enumerates dual requirements that aim to 
improve and maintain the quality of aid: regular monitoring and reporting to all 
stakeholders.  Currently, the Code of Conduct has 464 signatories who agree to abide by 
the ten principles laid out in the document.  It is important to note that although the 
majority of the international community has accepted these universal standards governing 
emergency response, they are legally unenforceable.   
As a follow-up to the Code of Conduct, a group of humanitarian NGOs launched 
the Sphere Project in 1997 alongside the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement.  Whereas the Code of Conduct establishes universal standards, the Sphere 
Project attempts to provide an operational framework for accountability in disaster 
response.  Sphere’s two core beliefs spring from the humanitarian imperative as 
delineated in the Code of Conduct.  “All possible steps should be taken to alleviate 
human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and…those affected by disaster 
have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance” (Sphere Handbook).  
The Sphere Handbook, finalized in 2004, includes two key documents: the Minimum 
Standards and the Humanitarian Charter.  The Minimum Standards outline the minimum 
qualitative standards that should be met in these five sectors: water and sanitation, 
nutrition, food, shelter, and health.  Parallels can be drawn between these standards and 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), particularly the goals of eradicating 
extreme poverty and hunger, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality, 
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combating diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global 
partnership for development (MDG).  The Humanitarian Charter complements the 
Minimum Standards by hearkening to the rights of the beneficiaries and the 
responsibilities of NGOs and governments.  Taken together, the Humanitarian Charter 
and the Minimum Standards contribute to an important operational framework for quality 
and for accountability in disaster relief efforts.  
 
Humanitarian Response Review of 2005 
 Even with the establishment of international standards and guidelines, 
humanitarian response is often perceived as inadequate and unable to meet the basic 
needs of affected populations.  In 2005, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and the 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) commissioned the 
Humanitarian Response Review in light of the increasing levels of humanitarian demand 
and the need to ensure that humanitarian actors take the appropriate steps to improve the 
timeliness and impact of humanitarian interventions.  This report is an independent 
assessment conducted by a team of three senior external consultants that reflects upon the 
humanitarian system, identifies the capabilities and shortfalls of humanitarian response, 
and develops a joint plan of action to improve response effectiveness and timeliness.  A 
large part of the review focuses on the response capacity of key humanitarian actors, such 
as the UN, NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).  Both benchmarking and the 
establishment of best practices are incorporated.  Following a comprehensive review of 
emergency funding, response capacity, and coordination and leadership roles, the 
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analysis provides a set of recommendations to address the gaps and assist humanitarian 
agencies in meeting future challenges.   
 
THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE 
 The humanitarian aid system has matured over the past decade, particularly with 
respect to the humanitarian reform agenda; however, it constantly adapts and evolves in 
response to the various challenges created by complex emergencies in the post-Cold War 
era.  McCall links the rise in ethnic, religious, cultural, and nationalistic tensions to the 
growing prevalence of complex emergencies.  Coupled with the expanding breadth of 
issues including environmental degradation, economic growth, stateless persons, climate 
refugees, and internally displaced persons, these complex emergencies pose great 
challenges to humanitarian actors.  The lack of enforcement structures within the 
coordination mandate debilitates their ability to tackle these complex emergencies.  
Along with the emergence of new issues, five other challenges continue to plague 
humanitarian aid: shrinking humanitarian space, inadequate funding, uncertainty 
surrounding disasters, firefighting, and poor coordination. 
 First, humanitarian space refers to (1) the physical space in which agencies 
conduct humanitarian work, and (2) the virtual space in which the various agencies 
interact (Tomasini 25).  Both physical and virtual spaces are shrinking because more 
areas are becoming insecure, and the overcrowding of NGOs with conflicting mandates 
and missions renders it increasingly harder for NGOs to carry out their work effectively.  
“The decline of humanitarian space is likely a product of complex factors, starting with 
the overall increasing level of violence and political judgments by insurgent groups that 
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in particular situations they gain more by attacking civilians than they lose by defying 
international humanitarian law” (Rubenstein 4).  For example “in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, humanitarian space has shrunk as the Taliban and other insurgent groups have 
stepped up attacks on civilians, especially international aid workers, contractors and local 
leaders” (Rubenstein 1).  The instability in the area poses dangers for both beneficiaries 
and humanitarian workers, and incapacitated aid work may prove to be more detrimental 
than no aid.   
 Second, the need for more funding is pervasive.  Funds tend to be allocated for 
visible and high-profile issues rather than on a needs basis, and this results in “fatigued 
crises”—crises that still need attention but fall from the limelight (Tomasini 29).  
Although Rwanda still required much rehabilitation work, “other ‘newsworthy’ 
international events soon focused global public attention elsewhere, with events in Haiti 
and Chechnya replacing the ongoing crises in the Great Lakes region” (Wright 55).  The 
mediatization of crises led to a phenomenon in which areas with the most urgent needs 
simply go unnoticed when the media does not focus on them (Tomasini 35).  The 
popularity of earmarked donations also leaves detrimental impacts.  Donors often prefer 
giving earmarked donations because they have greater influence over the way it is spent.  
By targeting their investment in particular areas or sectors, they can fulfill their priorities.  
This restrictiveness, however, results in a failure to meet the direst needs.   
 Third, high uncertainty surrounding the field can lead to the issue of firefighting, 
where humanitarian actors become incapacitated by the urgency of the emergency 
situation.  When this occurs, problems tend to escalate into crises, and performance levels 
drop along with the quality of aid.  Lastly, coordination remains a key challenge in all 
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disasters.  Even with the elaborate UN humanitarian response systems in place, the need 
for immediate rapid response and the highly different contexts of disasters make it 
difficult for the agencies and NGOs to deliver aid programs efficiently and effectively 
from the minute the disaster strikes. 
 
THE PILLARS OF HUMANITARIAN REFORM 
 To facilitate the disaster management cycle, OCHA has in place three pillars of 
humanitarian reform: the Humanitarian Coordinator System, the Central Emergency 
Response Fund (CERF), and the Cluster Approach.  These three pillars aim to strengthen 
the quality and quantity of leadership, improve the predictability of funding, and ensure 
more effective coordination, respectively.  All three pillars are grounded in a foundation 
of collaborative partnerships between UN and non-UN actors.5 
Figure 1. Three Pillars of Humanitarian Reform 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Leadership: Humanitarian Coordinator System 
 The first pillar of humanitarian reform concerns leadership, which performs the 
integral function of bringing together the diverse humanitarian actors, from host 
governments and donors to international agencies and NGOs, toward the shared goal.  
Beyond serving as a cohesive agent, the leadership also bears the responsibility of 
maintaining the quality of aid and ensuring accountability to the affected communities.  
The leadership reform effort centered on “clarifying duties and responsibilities of 
Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) and increasing the quality of HC candidates” 
(InterAction).  To this end, OCHA endeavored to improve the recruitment process by 
establishing the HC selection panel and the HC pool.  The formerly UN-only process has 
been opened to non-UN actors who may bring relevant experiences outside the UN 
framework into the HC role.  In addition to defining and broadening the qualifications for 
the HC position, OCHA put together an HC training system.  As NGOs put forward 
nominations for the HC role, OCHA created “a pool of ‘pre-approved’ HCs that could be 
sent out on short notice” (ICVA).  Also, to address the issue of Residential Coordinators 
(RCs) without humanitarian experience being asked to serve as joint RC/HCs, OCHA 
offers training to equip RCs with knowledge on humanitarian issues and established a 
mentoring program for seasoned RC/HCs to counsel newly appointed RC/HCs.  In 
certain situations, the RC and HC roles are separated.  
 
Financing: Central Emergency Response Fund  
  Launched in 2006, CERF strives to “promote early action and response to reduce 
loss of life, [to] enhance response to time-critical requirements, [and to] strengthen core 
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elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises” (CERF Site).  Various UN 
studies show that aid given in the first three weeks following a disaster delivers the 
largest impact (Kent 28).  Essentially, CERF helps jump-start critical humanitarian 
programs that lack funding.  Voluntary contributions by governments and private sector 
organizations enable the UN to allocate a total of US $500 million to disaster-stricken 
countries in the form of rapid response grants or underfunded emergency grants.  The 
former promotes “early action and response to reduce loss of life and to enhance response 
to time-critical requirements,” and the latter strengthens “core elements of humanitarian 
response in underfunded crises” (CERF HC Info Sheet).   
 CERF is designed to complement the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), an 
advocacy tool for humanitarian financing of long-term development.  Stakeholders come 
together to produce consolidated appeals highlighting needs in specific cluster areas, and 
OCHA disseminates these appeals online and through its publications.  Potential donors 
rely on the detailed reports in the appeals to assess how much they will donate and which 
cluster areas they will make donations toward.  “On average, since 1992, the 
Consolidated Appeals Process has sought $3.1 billion per year, and received $2.1 billion 
per year (68%)” (CAP Site).  The CAP, however, acts as much more than a mere appeal 
for funding because aid organizations use CAP as an integral tool “to plan, implement 
and monitor their activities together” (CAP Site).  The CAP process begins with 
analyzing the context, assessing needs, building scenarios, and setting priorities.  Then it 
advances into planning the response, issuing a flash or consolidated appeal, monitoring 
aid and revising the appeal, and finally reporting the situation to stakeholders.  Its 
invaluable assessment provides a platform on which governments, donors, aid agencies, 
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and NGOs can collaborate to ensure the delivery of high-quality aid.  Both CERF and 
CAP complement existing humanitarian funding mechanisms, and traditional donor 
sources, such as governments, still fund the majority of needs.  The United States is the 
largest state donor, contributing US $73,394,580 in 2009.  The European Commission 
and Japan follow behind the US in contributions.  
 
Coordination: Cluster Approach 
 The Cluster System is the third key UN humanitarian reform mechanism.  The IASC 
created the cluster system in 2005 in response to a UN review on the global humanitarian 
system, which recommended establishing the core areas of need.  Currently eleven 
clusters have been identified: protection, camp coordination and management, water 
sanitation and hygiene, health, emergency shelter, nutrition, emergency 
telecommunications, logistics, early recovery, education, and agriculture (UNMIT Site).   
Each cluster has a designated UN agency that serves as its lead agency at the global level.  
The following table shows the eleven designated global cluster leads, each accountable to 







Figure 2. Clusters and Their Lead Agencies at the Global Level 
 
At the onset of a disaster, the global cluster lead with the corresponding expertise is 
responsible for “strengthening system-wide preparedness and technical capacity and 
ensuring predictable leadership, accountability, and partnership,” according to the Second 
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Phase IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation.6  The lead agency strives to ensure that all 
needs in the cluster area are met and acts as the provider of last resort (PoLR); this means 
that the cluster lead should serve as backup in filling any existing gaps if no other 
humanitarian actor is able to do so.  At the onset of a disaster, the government may 
choose to activate clusters.  After the activation of a cluster, a lead organization—at times 
the same as the global cluster lead—receives the designation for overseeing national-
level coordination.  Cluster leads conduct regular meetings at the national, sub-national, 
and provincial levels on a “daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis, depending on the 
intensity of the crisis” (IASC Cluster Approach Phase 2).  During these meetings, cluster 
members share information, provide mutual feedback, create cluster strategies and work 
plans, organize joint activities, and prepare major funding appeals.  Working alongside 
the different cluster levels, the global cluster lead focuses their efforts in three areas: 
standards and policy-setting, building response capacity, and operational support.  The 







 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “The service clusters differ from the response clusters in that they provide services to other 
humanitarian organizations, rather than the affected population, have a stronger focus on global 
preparedness activities and, where necessary, act as the main service provider, rather than as 
provider of last resort” (IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation Phase 2). 
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Figure 3. Levels of the Cluster Approach 
 
 GPPI-URD conducted a survey to gather feedback on the cluster system, contacting 
over 600 humanitarians in different UN agencies and international NGOs.  Of the 241 
respondents, “75% of respondents felt that the introduction of the cluster approach had 
improved coordination and information exchange at the global level.”  They attributed 
improved dynamics among humanitarian actors to well-functioning global clusters, 
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particularly WASH, Logistics, and Education.  Less than a decade old, the cluster 
approach has much room for improvement, and humanitarian practitioners continue to 
fine-tune the system. 
 
THE UN, STATES, AND NGOS IN THE HUMANITARIAN SPACE 
Before exploring humanitarian response, one must establish an understanding of 
the humanitarian environment and particularly of the formal and informal linkages 
created among the different international actors.  The main actors in the humanitarian 
space include intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, states, and NGOs.  While 
UN agencies and states constitute the structured bureaucracy, the “rapidly evolving NGO 
galaxy” challenges its relatively static counterparts with its unstructured nature (Donini).   
 
UN Actors 
The reinvention of the humanitarian aid system not only entailed the 
establishment of the Code of Conduct and the Sphere Project, but also required the 
creation and redefinition of the roles of various international agencies and NGOs.  In 
1991, OCHA was established as the arm of the UN Secretariat that would amalgamate 
the humanitarian partners to bring about a coordinated rapid response to emergencies.  
Among other missions, OCHA primarily serves to “mobilize and coordinate effective and 
principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors” 
(OCHA Site).  To this end, OCHA advocates for the rights of people in need, promotes 
preparedness and prevention, and facilitates sustainable solutions.  Valerie Amos, the 
current Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 
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Coordinator (USG), heads OCHA and oversees the coordination of relief efforts 
internationally.   
Shortly after the establishment of OCHA, the IASC was created in 1992 to enable 
open dialogue between key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners.  Within the IASC, 
“disputes between partners are resolved, responsibilities are allocated to the various 
agencies, humanitarian policies are agreed upon, gaps are identified, and a common 
ethical framework is established” (IASC Site).  Therefore, the IASC is the primary 
mechanism for inter-agency communication and coordination.  The IASC is tantamount 
to a forum, whereas OCHA ensures that directives are carried out and humanitarian needs 
are met. 
Both OCHA and IASC conduct affairs in Geneva, Switzerland, and four other 
actors lead the emergency response on the ground.  Firstly, the United Nations Joint 
Logistics Centre (UNJLC) is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating 
logistics information.  The 1996 Eastern Zaire crisis brought to light the need for better 
coordination and pooling of vehicles and trucks among the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), and UNICEF (Fritz Institute).  
Under the custodianship of the World Food Programme, the UNJLC was formerly 
recognized as a UN humanitarian response mechanism in 2002.  When called upon, the 
UNJLC assesses the infrastructure and schedules the movement of humanitarian cargo 
and relief workers.   
Secondly, the HC, the most senior UN official on site, is in charge of ensuring 
that all stakeholders are meeting their obligations to the beneficiaries.  The HC is tasked 
with exercising diplomacy among the various NGOs, agencies, local government, donors, 
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and beneficiaries.  He or she has the responsibility of monitoring and assessing the 
situation, then reporting to the USG in Geneva.   
Thirdly, the HC has at hand the United Nations Disaster Assessment and 
Coordination (UNDAC) team, which is a stand-by team of disaster management 
professionals who are nominated and funded by member governments and various 
agencies.  In the event of a disaster, the country may request the assistance of the 
UNDAC team, which “can be deployed within hours to carry out rapid assessment of 
priority needs and to support national Authorities and the United Nations Resident 
Coordinator to coordinate international relief on-site” (UNDAC Site).   
 
States 
 During a humanitarian crisis, relations between national governments and 
international humanitarian actors are often tenuous.  On one hand, the government may 
be highly protective of its sovereignty, and on the other hand, the international 
community frequently fails to adequately include the government and local actors in 
coordinating and delivering the response.  Various international laws and statements of 
principle designate the state as the primary actor responsible during a crisis.  UN 
Resolution 46/182 states, 
“The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully 
respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, 
humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected 
country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country. 
Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of 
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natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the 
affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, 
and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory.” 
The Sphere guidelines and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 support UN 
Resolution 46/182, according the state the primary responsibility for disaster risk 
reduction.  ALNAP describes four main roles and responsibilities of the state: 
1. The state “calls” a crisis and invites international aid, 
2. The state provides assistance and protection, 
3. The state monitors and coordinates external assistance, and 
4. The state sets the regulatory and legal frameworks governing relief assistance. 
  The degree to which governments carry out these roles depends upon the nation’s 
infrastructural, human resource, and material capacity.  Varying situations also influence 
the role of the state.  In cases such as Sri Lanka, the government refuses to allow the 
international actors access into the country and rejects visa and program applications.  In 
other cases, close cooperation between national authorities and international humanitarian 
actors may lead to over-reliance, resulting in a weakened government.  An overpowering 
international presence can generate resentment from the people and the government as 
they perceive the agencies to be more expensive and less effective.  Also, the 
international agencies may cause a human capital drainage; in Afghanistan, the higher 
wages offered by international aid agencies draw skilled professionals away from the 
government.  The trend, however, shows a growing willingness on the part of the 






For the purposes of this research, humanitarian NGOs will be given an elastic 
definition that carries the essence of the World Bank’s definition and combines Vakil’s 
and Willets’s definitions.  They are self-governing, private, mostly apolitical, not-for-
profit organizations striving to improve the quality of life of disadvantaged persons 
through legal means, such as advocacy and operational activities.  In this context, NGOs 
do not include lobbyists, pressure groups, or global civil society, and they are not all 
professional given the volunteer base (Maiyegun).  Their actions often reflect the 
objectives of those to whom they are accountable, namely donors, beneficiaries, their 
own organizational mission, and their peers with whom they collaborate.  Lloyd classifies 
these stakeholders in terms of the following accountabilities, respectively: upward, 
downward, inward, and horizontal.   
Beginning in 1968 with the adoption of the Economic and Social Council 
Resolution 1296, NGOs became formally integrated into the international policymaking 
scene.  At the time, only international NGOs could exercise their consultative status, so 
national NGOs would engage in international diplomacy through the international NGOs.  
The presence of many local NGOs at the Rio Earth Summit in June 1992 spurred an 
upsurge of local and national NGOs organizing in the global arena, which led to 
Resolution 1996/31 and the accreditation of sub-regional, regional, and national NGOs.  
Furthermore, the Cardoso Report of 2004 proposed ways to bring greater coherence and 
consistency to UN-NGO relations.  The proliferation of NGOs and the empowerment of 
NGOs in global policymaking signified a shift away from a top-down hierarchical 
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relationship between the UN and NGOs, where the NGO community simply carries out 
UN initiatives and policies.   
NGOs play a crucial role in humanitarian response in terms of providing relief 
workers and resources.  The two key NGOs are the International Federation of the Red 
Cross (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the former 
handling natural disasters and the latter mitigating conflict disasters.  Over the past 
decade, debate has risen over the relative roles of the UN humanitarian agencies and the 
NGOs.  While the UN agencies have the authority as neutral international bodies to lead 
the centralization of the humanitarian aid structure, they are heavily dependent upon 
well-established NGOs such as Oxfam, Amnesty International, CARE International, and 
Catholic Relief Services because they provide invaluable support, resources, and 
expertise.  On the other hand, many NGOs cannot allocate sufficient staff time because 
they face a tight constraint on resources.  Donors would need to augment funding and 
support if an NGO were to co-lead a cluster.  In regard to the subject of cluster co-leads, 
the Review of the engagement of NGOs with the humanitarian reform process 
commissioned by The NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project articulates, “The primary 
function of NGO technical staff is to support the in-country work by ensuring quality and 
relevance rather than to support UN functions” (26).  Nonetheless, NGOs such as the 
IFRC and ICRC, whose founding dates back to 1919, bring years of experience and 
institutional knowledge.  Because of their heavy involvement in the humanitarian system 
and the vital needs they serve, NGOs have been advocating for a greater voice in high-






THE REDISTRIBUTION OF POWER FROM STATES TO NGOS 
 In accordance with realism, one of the predominant schools of political thought, 
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia established a political order in which the state is the 
principal actor in international politics.  The raison d’état revolves around national 
security, which is necessary when anarchy dominates the international arena and 
disincentivizes states from developing trusting relationships.  Universal moral principles 
do not exist in state-state relations.  Therefore, the state is in the constant pursuit of 
power—both military and economic—to guarantee its survival in the hostile 
environment.  In this political paradigm, civil society begins only after power has been 
organized and security is secured.  The upsurge of intrastate conflict after the end of the 
Cold War, however, challenges the Westphalian state-centric model.  Consider the fact 
that “from May 1988…to [December 2007], there have been 47 conflicts in which the 
United Nations intervened and only three of them were inter-state in character” (Yilmaz).  
The decline in traditional state-to-state threat feeds “a growing sense that individuals’ 
security may not in fact reliably derive from their nation’s security” (Mathews).  
Mathews claims that the power of states is actually declining relative to that of non-state 
actors—namely, businesses, international organizations, and NGOs.  Consider former US 
President George H.W. Bush’s reference to service-oriented individuals and 
organizations as “a thousand points of light…that are spread like stars throughout the 
Nation, doing good.”  He states, “We will work hand in hand, encouraging, sometimes 
leading, sometimes being led, rewarding.”  Clearly, the state is no longer an autonomous 
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agent.  “In many countries, [NGOs] are delivering the services—in urban and rural 
community development, education, and health care—that faltering governments can no 
longer manage,” and furthermore, “today NGOs deliver more official development 
assistance than the entire UN system (excluding the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund)” (Mathews).  Mathews’ article epitomizes the optimism in the 1990s 
about the emergence of NGOs and civil society and their potential to “fill the gap” left 
where governments will not, or cannot, function. 
 
THE ROLE OF NGOS, RECONSIDERED 
 The emergence of the paradigm in which NGOs serve as principal service 
providers has spurred scholarship on the question, “Who is responsible for providing, 
financing, planning, and regulating services?”  The World Bank suggests that the Central 
Government, which traditionally has been associated with the provision of social 
services, now is trending toward contributing financially and outsourcing the actual 
provision of social services (Cannon).  The segment opposing Mathews argues that 
NGOs should not be serving in such a capacity.  One of the main reasons provided is that 
NGOs’ power would consequently undermine states.  In addition, the NGOs’ 
contributions may in fact be detrimental to the population served.  Christy Cannon, 
Christopher Collier, and Alan Whaites articulate this perspective and advance three 
arguments around several cases.   
 First, if NGOs are fulfilling the service provision responsibility on behalf of the 
government, the government loses the chance to develop its capacity to provide the 
services, and it also relinquishes its lead role in policy formation.  As an example, 
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Cannon notes, “Uganda’s health sector will necessarily be the responsibility of a range of 
agencies for many years to come, and decentralization is well under way.”  Ugandan 
nationals have grown to expect “peace and security before service-provision” from their 
government (Cannon).  With diverse agencies at different capacity levels, different 
regions often experience a range of service quality.  While the decentralization of power 
may promote greater partnership between the government and NGOs at the local level, it 
presents a significant coordination challenge at the national level.  Instead, if the 
government were to manage the provision of services and centralize the process, the 
quality of service provided would be standardized throughout the regions.   
  Second, NGOs working toward short-term goals to fill the immediate gap 
sometimes lose sight of the need to sustain their interventions.  While NGOs serve as 
interim providers, the task ultimately falls on the shoulders of the government and local 
agencies when the NGOs exit.  Collier states that NGOs tend to “overlook existing local 
capacities and responsibilities when designing and implementing their projects.”  Besides 
the inherent inefficiency, this also prevents both NGOs and local agencies from moving 
forward and establishing long-term sustainable initiatives for the community.  Collier 
also argues that NGOs reduce the accountability of local government to the people by 
“using its own front-line staff” and eliminating government participation in order to 
“ensure that positive reports [flow] back to donors on a timely basis.”  This practice may 
help NGOs in their pursuit for additional funding, which is critical to their survival; 
however, the human and financial resources of the government become overlooked in 
turn, and new NGO initiatives may jeopardize existing local initiatives.  Whaites supports 
Collier’s argument and further proposes that NGOs exude “an over-eagerness to fill gaps 
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in service provision” when they should actually “seek to build up the capacity of the 
state,” barring “mitigating circumstances.”  Sustainability is key to any successful service 
effort, and the willing participation of local counterparts—both the people and the 
government—is a necessary ingredient to sustainability.  Therefore, NGOs should not 
“damage prospects for genuine development by undermining the relationship between the 
people and their government” (Collier).  Instead, NGOs should play an intermediary role 
and bring the local people and government closer in planning and implementing 
development initiatives.  An enforceable system to hold the government accountable 
could be achieved when the NGO helps local people become aware of the responsibilities 
and capacities of their government and creates a forum for popular organization and 
participation (Collier).  
Third, NGOs may be so intent on meeting needs that they compromise their 
mission integrity in order to meet the funding criteria set forth by donors and 
government.  “Ugandan NGOs powerfully expressed their survival instinct, or the need to 
bring in enough money to remain viable,” according to Cannon.  She points to the 
example of a mobile AIDS home-care program: insufficient funds prompted the dropping 
of the program in two counties of the Masaka District, whereas funding from DANIDA 
allowed the program to add two counties in the Rakai District.  Also, NGOs tend to be 
reticent about divulging budgets and work plans with others besides their donors.  
Sometimes this lack of transparency between NGOs and the government contributes to 
tension and rivalry.  On one hand, district personnel resent NGOs for refusing to share 
the financial information; on the other hand, NGOs claim they are willing to discuss and 
coordinate activities. NGOs worry that the funding “may eventually prompt the 
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government to institute regulations defining the kind of information which District 
officials are entitled to know from NGOs” (Cannon). 
 Overwhelmingly, Cannon, Collier, and Whaites express the importance of NGOs 
assuming roles that do not undermine the government, local agencies, and local 
population.  Although NGOs are vital to service provision and often provide better-
quality service, the long-term sustainability of the development effort is of utmost 
importance.  
 
NGO EFFECTIVENESS, RECONSIDERED 
 NGO effectiveness should also be reexamined in terms of their immediate need to 
sustain themselves.  There is a mounting discussion on the adverse effect of material 
incentives on the transnational aid sector.  Some argue that financial constraints pressure 
NGOs into competition for limited resources, thus generating negative consequences 
when aid projects are poorly coordinated.  For example, James Pfeiffer presents a case 
study of Mozambique’s health sector and argues that the deluge of NGOs since the late 
1980s has “fragmented the health system and contributed to intensifying social inequality 
in local communities.”  
  The global civil society has never been as robust, as evidenced by the rapidly 
growing transnational aid sector: “between 1960 and 1996, the number of INGOs grew 
from 1,000 to 5,500,” more than quintupling (Cooley and Ron).  The growing 
organizational density, contractual incentives, and organizational pressures prod NGOs to 
prioritize financial considerations over serving the people.  Cooley and Ron argue that 
undoubtedly “many of today’s INGOs are motivated by normative agendas,” but 
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“insecurity and competition…often [push today’s INGOs] to behave in rational and rent-
seeking ways.”  The competitive environment inhibits cooperation and even generates 
incentives that result in inoperative outcomes, contrary to the popular assumption that 
market-based competition produces efficiency and effectiveness.  Cooley and Ron refer 
to this as the “multiple-principals problem” phenomenon, which occurs when multiple 
groups seeking control over the same project act unilaterally and conceal information to 
undermine their competitors.  Because of the competitive aid market, NGOs constantly 
need to “renew, extend, or win new contracts, regardless of the project’s overall utility” 
(Cooley and Ron).  Together, the multiple-principals problem and competitive bidding 
foster marketized mentalities and a competitive dynamic among NGOs that are 
counterproductive to aid coordination and delivery.  
 
NGOS, STATES, AND UN AGENCIES’ ROLES 
 This study focuses on the various coordination roles among NGOs, states, and 
international agencies and contributes to the discussion by looking at the circumstances 
under which NGOs can effectively respond to natural disasters.  The experiences in 
Myanmar and in Haiti suggest that the optimism of the 1990s may have been a premature 
reaction.  A disconnect exists between the NGOs’ function to provide immediate relief 
and the overarching long-term development needs of the state.  NGOs and international 
agencies competing for scarce humanitarian funding do not have the necessary human 
capital, resources, or infrastructural knowledge of the state to deliver on this front.  








“…In 48 seconds, life went out in Haiti.  The afternoon of 12 January 2010 took 
with it 300,000 lives, left one million homeless and destroyed nearly all of the 
buildings in the capital, Port-au-Prince, including the Presidential Palace, the 
Legislative Palace and the Palace of Justice.  Other cities, including Léogane, 
Jacmel and Petit-Goâve, were also severely affected.  The total losses have been 
estimated at around 8 billion dollars, which represents, according to experts, 
120% of the GNP of Haiti in 2009.”  
 




Before examining the response to the Haiti earthquake, it is important to 
understand the country of Haiti.  Haiti encompasses over 27,750 square kilometers of 
land in the Caribbean.  The population in 2009 was 9.86 million (World Bank).  Prior to 
the earthquake in Haiti, “55% of the population” lived “below the international poverty 
line of 1.25 USD per day,” a product of the country’s long history of natural and 
manmade disasters (Dolan and Ververs).  Haiti ranked 158th out of 187 countries on the 
Human Development Index, which is based on a variety of indicators from health and 
education to human freedoms and economic growth.  A high level of social inequality 
pervaded the country.  The poverty and inequality created a dependence on foreign aid 
and funding; prior to the earthquake, 800 national and international NGOs—all listed in 




One of the most destructive natural disasters of the 21st century struck the nation 
of Haiti on January 12, 2010.  The earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter scale 
dilapidated the capital of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas, killing 222,650 people, 
injuring 310,930 people, displacing more than 2.1 million people, and compounding the 
already high level of chronic poverty with material loss that amounted to “more than 
100% of Haiti’s national income” (OCHA).  The following figure depicts the 
earthquake’s impact across the geographical regions in Haiti. 
Figure 4. Map of Haiti Earthquake 
 
The earthquake not only affected over 3 million people, but also crippled the Government 
of Haiti (GoH) and set back the UN by taking the lives of key decision-makers and by 
turning infrastructure into debris.  “The Haitian government lost 33% of its personnel and 
the UN lost 102 staff members,” and the building damage assessment reported 403,176 
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damaged or destroyed buildings (OCHA).  Beyond the deaths of decision-makers and 
civil servants, the Ministry of the Interior, which housed the Emergency Operations 
Center and the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC), the Port-au-Prince fire station, 
and the National Disaster Risk Management System (NDRMS) were all heavily 
damaged.  The lack of functioning mobile phones and government vehicles cut off 
communication and transportation, which were vital to GoH’s assessment of the situation 
and response.  Also, “30 hospitals of 49 in the affected areas were destroyed or 
damaged,” severely reducing response capacity (OCHA).  The Post Disaster Needs 
Assessment (PDNA) estimated that the earthquake produced a total value of damage and 
losses of US $7.8 billion—US $4.3 billion in physical damage and US $3.5 billion in 
economic losses.7  These damages and losses reduced the country’s GDP by 70% (Office 
of the Special Envoy). 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the Haitian population rose to the 
challenge and led the initial response despite facing major challenges—limited first aid 
knowledge, the absence of electricity, widespread debris, and personal loss and trauma.  
Neighbors, local CSOs, and communities saved countless lives while the government and 
international community struggled to overcome the constraints.   
 The GoH, although severely diminished in size and capacity to lead the initial 
response, immediately worked together with the international community to implement a 
coordinating mechanism and operationalized the DPC the day after the earthquake before 
authorities even activated the Centre d’Opérations d’Urgence (COU) (IASC).  Regular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 PDNA is a government-led exercise that pulls together information into a single, consolidated 
report detailing information on the physical impacts of a disaster, the economic value of the 




meetings between the Council of Ministers and international representatives led to the 
reactivation of the cluster approach on January 15, 2010.8  Each cluster was co-led by a 
Minister or senior civil servant from a corresponding Ministry.  Ministers also had to 
oversee the coordination in municipalities.   
 At the regional level, neighboring Latin American and Caribbean countries rallied 
to support Haiti.  Regional entities CARICOM and OAS responded immediately with 
emergency supplies and pledges of financial assistance.  They also took part in strategic 
recovery discussions with the GoH.  The Dominican Republic, the first country to 
respond due to its proximity to Haiti, generously offered food, water, and mobile medical 
units.  They also provided a resourceful solution to the logistical crisis in which the large 
amount of debris prevented the transportation of vital supplies by offering their territory 
and facilities, such as the airport, hospitals, emergency teams, and telecommunications 
services.  
 On the international front, international Search and Rescue (SAR) teams, the 
UNDAC team and other UN agencies, NGOs, international military, and humanitarian 
donors contributed their personnel and resources.  “Within 24 hours, 27 countries had 
offered [Search and Rescue] teams and 3 were already in-country (Iceland, Dominican 
Republic, and the US), and within 48 hours, 6 teams were operational” (IASC).  The 13-
member UNDAC team mobilized with similar rapidity, arriving in Haiti less than a day 
after the earthquake.  UNDAC coordinated the SAR teams in addition to conducting the 
initial assessments.9  By the time the GoH called off the search for survivors on January 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Clusters had been established in Haiti in 2008 to coordinate the response to the Gonaives flood 
emergency. 
9 “The UNDAC team established an Onsite Operations and Coordination Centre (OSOCC) in the 
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23, 2010, “67 teams had rescued a total of 134 people,” a record number for SAR teams.  
NGOs prepositioned in Haiti supported the initial assistance using in-country contingency 
stocks that were not damaged by the earthquake.  Numerous humanitarian organizations 
flooded Haiti and joined in the relief effort.   
 Additionally, considerable international military presence from 26 countries 
facilitated the recovery effort and provided valuable services from debris management to 
goods dissemination.  Within the first ten days, the US military had conducted 336 air 
deliveries of water, meals, and medical supplies (IASC).  In the initial response stages, 
the US, Canada, and the Dominican Republic contributed the largest fleets.  To better 
coordinate the military resources, the Coordination Support Committee (CSC) and the 
Joint Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC) were put in place.  The CSC, co-chaired by 
the GoH and the United Nations Stabilizing Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), was a 
platform that brought together the US military, MINUSTAH, humanitarian 
representatives, and donors to plan and task strategic operations in such a way as to 
capitalize on the existing resources.  The JOTC, established by MINUSTAH, OCHA, the 
Logistics cluster, and other partners, served as a “centralized coordinating body for the 
use of military assets” (IASC). 
  The Humanitarian Country Team, comprised of the Humanitarian Coordinator, 
UN agencies, NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and 
donors, played the overarching role of strategic coordination in the initial emergency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
MINUSTAH Logistics Base in Port-au-Prince, supported by the European Civil Protection 
Mechanism (EU-MIC) and staff of OCHA. Two sub-OSOCCs were established in Jacmel and 
Léogâne to assist local authorities and humanitarian actors involved in the response. The UNDAC 
team, in cooperation with technical experts from the EU-MIC team and the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC), conducted the initial damage and impact assessment in the earthquake-affected 




phase.  Key donors included the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), and the Spanish Cooperation (AECID).  OCHA assisted in an 
advisory role on multiple topics from civil-military liaison to information management 
and from inter-cluster coordination to mapping. 
“By May 2010, over 1,000 international organizations had provided humanitarian 
assistance in Haiti,” with 57% of the 1.5 billion USD Revised Humanitarian Appeal 
funding obtained (IASC RTE).  The Food and Shelter clusters also made headway in the 
immediate aftermath with food aid, Cash for Work programs, and tarpaulin distributions.  
Despite the quick mobilization of international aid, the overwhelming scale of the 
disaster left international actors mired in the chaotic disorganization, and in due time, the 
sizable presence of largely amateur small volunteer groups from the Caribbean and the 
US—over 4,000 in total—strained the coordination system.  Additionally, the “partial, 
sensationalist, and celebrity-obsessed media” relayed inaccurate and skewed messages 
during early stages of the response, “thereby inadvertently affecting funding allocation 
decisions” (Shepherd-Barron).  Inexperienced humanitarian actors, poorly adapted 
practices in urban contexts, and weak global leadership undermined the efficient 
activation of cluster coordination and assembly of resources between January and April 
2010 (IASC RTE).  The Haiti experience exposed gaps in the cluster approach when 
confronted simultaneously with a colossal disaster and a severely weakened government 




  Before the earthquake, nutrition posed a challenge in impoverished Haiti.  An 
estimated 32% of children under the age of five experienced chronic malnutrition, and 
58% of the total population suffered undernourishment (IFPRI Global Hunger Index, 
FAO Statistics).  Furthermore, inadequate childcare for young children imperiled their 
nutritional security during the window of opportunity, “the period between conception 
and age two when the irreversible damage caused by malnutrition can and should be 
prevented” (ALNAP).  Only 40% of children 0-6 months were exclusively breastfed, and 
only 32% of children 6-24 months benefited from appropriate complementary feeding 
practices.  The earthquake exacerbated the food insecurity and placed large numbers of 
Haitians at increased risk of mortality and malnutrition, “particularly acute malnutrition 
and micronutrient deficiencies” (Flash Appeal).  Haitians had less accessibility to 
nutritious food and a weakened government to cope with the crisis, but the country had 
an influx of humanitarian actors working on nutrition security. 
 The Nutrition Cluster was immediately established upon the activation of the 
Cluster Approach.  UNICEF served as the cluster lead when the cluster was officially 
activated one week after the earthquake.  The February 2010 Flash Appeal listed feeding 
infants and young children and maintaining the nutritional status of children as a priority.  
It also identified women—particularly pregnant and lactating mothers—and children as 
the most vulnerable groups, with 1.47 million women and children needing nutritional 
support, among which 360,000 consisted of children under the age of five.  The World 
Bank enumerated the following priority actions for securing nutrition in Haiti: (1) reduce 
chronic malnutrition, (2) reduce micronutrient deficiencies in iron, iodine, and vitamin A, 
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(3) reduce chronic food insecurity, and (4) improve the health system and include 
nutrition services.  Main elements of the cluster response addressed the nutrition 
priorities by providing food rations and complementary feeding programs for at-risk 
populations (Plumpynut and micronutrient powder), opening community outpatient care 
centers and mobile units to treat severe acute malnutrition (SAM), mobilizing caregivers 
to give nutritional counseling, and erecting baby-friendly feeding tents in camps.   
Despite its efforts, the Nutrition Cluster was plagued by weak predictability and 
accountability of leadership and ownership, poor cohesiveness in partnerships due to 
divergent political interests, and outstanding gaps.  The momentum in the rapid call to 
action was not sustained in the follow-through.   
  Along the first dimension, the Nutrition Cluster was characterized by weak 
leadership and accountability.  First, a general shortage of qualified nutritionists globally 
reduced the human resource (HR) surge capacity during the Haiti response.  UNICEF had 
to compete with other UN agencies and NGOs for qualified practitioners.  The French 
language prerequisite further complicated the search because far too few French-speaking 
personnel could be deployed on short notice.  UNICEF reflected that “the Nutrition 
Cluster and section remained understaffed in terms of the number and quality of staff for 
most of the response,” and “unlike in the WASH Cluster, use of standby partners and 
institutional contracts with specialist organizations as an approach to rapid deployment 
[was] not well developed in the Nutrition Cluster.”  The Global Nutrition Cluster (GNC) 
was “running at about one third of its required capacity” with one half-time Cluster 
Officer and one part-time GNC Coordinator based in the UK at the time of the 
earthquake (Dolan and Ververs).  Also, there was an unfilled Nutrition in Emergencies 
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(NIE) post in UNICEF’s headquarter Nutrition Section.  UNICEF looked toward staff 
from HQ, regional, and country offices to fill the capacity gap as quickly as possible due 
to the lack of local staff.  However, because temporary internal redeployment decreases 
capacity in other countries or offices, UNICEF has since shifted their HR strategy to 
emphasize sustainable funding as a way to recruit and fill key regional and country-level 
cluster positions. 
The shortage of UNICEF staff and the bureaucratic nature of the emergency 
human resources section encumbered the aid process.  Humanitarian practitioners faced 
the dilemma of juggling activities critical to the response: revising Flash Appeals and 
administering life-saving programs.  A shortage in implementing partners paralleled the 
UNICEF staff shortage; the high mortality reduced the number of available nurses and 
French- or Creole-speaking nutrition experts, while survivors were often too traumatized 
and preoccupied with personal matters to work effectively.  Underfunding further 
reduced human resources and capacity-building initiatives, such as the Nutrition Cluster 
Handbook.  Without the appropriate people and resources in the right place, organizations 
could not take leadership or ownership of an area.  Due to the critical need one month 
into the disaster, the Country Nutrition Cluster (CNC) Coordinator was finally able to 
secure funding to hire qualified international staff from NGOs.   
In addition, UNICEF’s weak leadership contributed to significant inefficiencies.  
As the designated lead agency and thus the PoLR, UNICEF was responsible for 
providing resources to fill remaining gaps in the Nutrition Cluster.  The unprecedented 
scale of the disaster, however, placed severe strains on UNICEF in fulfilling its duty as 
the PoLR.  Partially due to UNICEF’s lack of technical authority, internal conflict 
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erupted in the cluster as diverse partners within the Nutrition Cluster had difficulty 
reaching a consensus on the correct assessment methods and the actual level of the 
affected population’s needs.  Nonetheless, cluster members endeavored to counter the 
setbacks and to improve the cluster’s work.  
Furthermore, the second dimension of accountability needed improvement on 
multiple fronts: within the cluster lead organization and between the cluster lead and 
cluster members.  Due to the uncertain correlation between the job descriptions of the 
Nutrition Cluster coordinator and UNICEF program staff, the lack of clarity and 
understanding surrounding the cluster approach in the early stages of the emergency led 
to poor coordination of roles and responsibility.  UNICEF worked to align the two roles 
and revise the terms of reference.  The experience in Haiti revealed “an urgent need to 
develop the respective accountability structures not only within UNICEF but also for the 
partners” (Haiti Field Exchange).  It also underscored the need for guidance on 
mainstreaming commitments to establish clarity on cluster and coordination roles, 
responsibilities, and accountabilities.  
The GNC and the Country Nutrition Cluster (CNC), however, enhanced 
accountability between cluster members with regular coordination meetings.10  Regular 
GNC emergency coordination meetings led by the CNC Coordinator in Haiti gave global 
partners—UN agencies, NGOs, and other humanitarian actors—a chance to share 
information, assess the situation, and update others on the nutrition situation.  Similar to 
the GNC meetings, the CNC meetings provided a forum for discussion among the GoH 
and international agencies, meeting frequently—“initially three times per week for up to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Between January 15 and 18, 2010, the country-level cluster coordination team was assembled.   
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1.5 hours” (Dolan and Ververs).  Thirty to forty participants from a range of 
organizations attended the meetings to discuss challenges and solutions.  While the GNC 
worked together and identified an immediate area of focus—infant and young child 
feeding in the emergency (IFE), the CNC team also established focus areas, as 
enumerated by Carmel Dolan, the GNC Consultant, and Mija Ververs, the CNC 
Coordinator: 
• Protecting, supporting, and feeding children safely 
• Administering micronutrient supplementation 
• Overseeing community-based management of acute malnutrition  
• Controlling and coordinating breast milk substitute donations. 
After the IFE Core Group identified three main areas of concern—supporting 
mothers giving birth and nourishing their babies without healthcare facilities, caring for 
infants in the event their mothers have died or are injured, and managing the influx of 
breast milk substitutes arriving in Haiti—they discussed and leveraged lessons from the 
2004 Indonesia earthquake, 2006 China earthquake, 2008 Myanmar cyclone, and 2009 
Philippines floods.  Indeed, they adapted the UN interagency Joint Statement used in 
Myanmar and in China to the Haiti context, and radio broadcasts helped to relay 
important IFE announcements to the public in Haitian Creole.  Although operational 
agencies had difficulty translating guidance from the Joint Statement to field work, the 
fast action taken in the area of IFE speaks to the cluster approach’s strength in 
galvanizing stakeholders to make joint decisions.  Like the GNC, the CNC also 
demonstrated both challenge and success in accountability of leadership and ownership.  
On one hand, human resources posed a challenge to the CNC coordination team: some 
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candidates received formal training but lacked coordination experience, while others had 
experience but lacked training.  On the other hand, the Director of Nutrition of the 
Ministry of Health co-chaired meetings with the CNC Coordinator from UNICEF and 
aligned cluster efforts with national nutrition policies.  
On the second dimension, the Nutrition Cluster needed mechanisms for 
actualizing the concept of peer accountability through productive partnerships.  This 
concept “stipulates that NGOs as cluster co-facilitators should be accountable to their 
peers, since accountability toward the Humanitarian Coordinator does not apply to 
organizations outside the UN system” (GPPI-URD).  The unstable political landscape 
rendered partnership in the cluster difficult.  “Fear of exposure to public scrutiny and 
critique, and the NGOs’ worry of decreasing their scope for advocacy vis-à-vis the UN” 
compounded the negative effects of the political instability, inhibiting NGOs and the 
government from co-facilitating the cluster (GPPI-URD).  The initial confusion 
surrounding the cluster approach and the lack of knowledge of some organizations could 
be attributed in part to the need for greater partnerships.  For example, the problematic 
surplus of breast milk substitutes—well-meaning but unsolicited donations—illustrates 
the detrimental effect of misinformation.  In initiating or accepting these breast milk 
substitutes, organizations often breached the International Code on Marketing of Breast 
Milk Substitutes and obstructed meaningful aid initiatives because the CNC Coordinator 
had to turn their attention to managing the unsolicited donations.  The creation of 
synergies between the different actors and agencies through closer cooperation would 
facilitate greater information-sharing.  In another example, the supply of Ready-to-Use 
Infant Formula (RUIF) by a donor through an NGO highlighted “the Nutrition Cluster’s 
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ability to draw on cluster partner resources in response to a need” (Haiti Field Exchange).  
UNICEF provided a significant portion of the supplies in fulfillment of its duties as a 
major cluster partner, but cluster members also shared the responsibility and acted as 
partners.  Efforts to establish coherency across plans and to implement common 
strategies and standards, though much delayed, were not entirely in vain.  The lack of 
data on artificial feeding care estimates prompted the CNC team and partners to prepare 
detailed programming guidance from scratch.   Their fruitful partnership led to 
productive gains in IFE programming and learning and a rapid technical response.  Also, 
the reliable internet connection, rebuilt several weeks after the earthquake, allowed the 
CNC team to share up-to-date knowledge and useful information among partners on the 
Nutrition Cluster website.  Beyond intra-cluster partnerships, greater alignment was 
necessary between clusters.  The general emergency response failed to integrate and 
prioritize the IFE program of the Nutrition Cluster, consequently leaving potential 
synergies untapped.  As for partnering with GoH, “UNICEF’s pre-existing country office 
presence facilitated understanding of the situation and contributed to better relationships 
with government” (Haiti Field Exchange).  Guidelines and tools collaboratively 
developed by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF before the earthquake “facilitated 
consensus building, ownership and mutual interest among all partners working together, 
and even with less traditional nutrition partners” (Haiti Field Exchange). 
On the third dimension regarding impact on the population, the productive 
partnership between the Nutrition Cluster and GoH did not extend to the interaction 
between the Nutrition Cluster and the local population.  “The affected population was 
largely excluded from the design and implementation of the response”; beneficiaries did 
 	  
48	  
not serve in any meaningful capacity in deciding how the response was to be carried out 
(Haiti Real-Time Evaluation).  This contributed to UNICEF’s low NIE capacity at the 
regional level.  The fact that accessible beneficiaries were not included in the response 
process in either design or implementation points to two realities: (1) the humanitarian 
actors’ inexperience in navigating the complex urban environment, and (2) the poor effort 
to increase participation by the affected population.  The Nutrition Cluster’s failure to 
implement mechanisms for promoting inclusive and participatory approaches toward 
engaging civil society was a byproduct of the cluster approach’s endeavor to improve 
accountability by focusing on formal accountability mechanisms.  These formal 
mechanisms include international and national humanitarian law, protocols, codes of 
conducts, evaluations, memorandums of understanding, joint policy agreements, and 
partnerships (ALNAP).  As mentioned previously, formal accountability mechanisms 
were not adequately enforced between partners.  The GPPI-URD report suggests that by 
focusing on formal accountability mechanisms instead of balancing formal with informal 
mechanisms, the diversity and independence of actors were undermined.  The formal 
nature led to the formation of a hierarchy and the weakening of partnerships.  The 
hierarchical, top-down coordination undermined informal accountability toward civil 
society, degrading the  quality of the humanitarian response.  Furthermore, the 
hierarchical organization weakened coordination efforts.  For example, decisions made at 
the UNICEF headquarters and regional office regarding the nutrition supply pipeline and 
logistics chain overruled decisions made by field-level nutritionists (Dolan and Ververs).  
The complex organization contributed to delay, misunderstanding, and tension.  Not only 
did UNICEF nutritionists feel their mapping work was overlooked, but the weak 
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coordination also prevented UNICEF from transporting supplies from well-stocked 
warehouse to the field in a timely manner initially. 
  As for outstanding gaps, chronic malnutrition remained a “deeply rooted 
structural challenge for Haiti’s children” one year following the earthquake (UNICEF).  
Ten thousand severely acutely malnourished children without medical complications 
received medical attention in 159 Outpatient Therapeutic Programs, and 1,250 severely 
acutely malnourished children with medical complications were nursed in 28 
Stabilization Centers (UNICEF).  Nevertheless, children in distant rural areas and those 
in densely populated urban slums, such as Cité Soleil and Croix de Bouquets, continued 
to lack access to services.  From another perspective, the relatively stable levels of acute 
malnutrition testify to the efficacy of UNICEF’s preventive interventions, such as blanket 
feeding and distributing micronutrients and deworming tablets.  In the IFE area, UNICEF 
constructed a network of 107 Baby-Friendly Tents and Corners as centers for nutritional 
counseling and advice for mothers and children.  “By December 2010, more than 102,000 
children under twelve months and over 48,900 mothers” had benefitted from this 
initiative (UNICEF).  The following table tracks the cluster’s progress: 
Figure 5. Haiti Nutrition Cluster Targets and Progress in 2010 
 
 
In the areas of systems-strengthening and capacity-building, UNICEF assisted the 
Ministry of Health financially and technically to develop a national protocol for the 
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management of severe acute malnutrition.  The widespread implementation of the 
national protocol marked a turning point in standardization and harmonization of 
practices.  Another national protocol, Infant and Young Child Feeding, was created 
shortly after.  Once lifesaving emergency efforts mitigated immediate needs, the 
Nutrition Cluster gradually turned its attention to largely unaddressed chronic needs. 
  The following table provides a summary of the Haiti Nutrition Cluster’s overall 
performance across the three dimensions. 
Figure 6. Haiti Nutrition Cluster Evaluation 
Haiti Nutrition Cluster 
Overall Performance: Ineffective 
Leadership and 
Accountability 
Partnership Impact on Population 
Ineffective 
• Capacity of cluster lead 
UNICEF questioned 
• HR challenge  
• Weak UNICEF lead 
• Respective accountability 
structures lacking 
• Weak accountability 
within cluster lead 
organization and between 
cluster lead and members 









• Information-sharing on 
website 
• Poor inter-cluster 
coordination 
• Inefficiencies resulting 
from misinformation 
Ineffective 
• Beneficiaries excluded 
from response 
• Focus on formal 
accountability 
mechanisms 
• Chronic malnutrition one 
year later 
• Stable levels of acute 
malnutrition 






 James Shepherd-Barron, the third WASH Cluster Coordinator serving from May 
5 to August 1, 2010, observed that even before the earthquake, Port-au-Prince “had one 
of the worst sanitation situations of any capital city in the world,” with no sewage 
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network or treatment plant.  UNICEF reported, “Only 19% of people had access to 
improved sanitation facilities, down from 29% in 1990.”  The earthquake exacerbated the 
poor sanitation and hygiene conditions in Haiti.  UNICEF cited, “More than 1.5 million 
displaced people had no immediate access to safe drinking water or a toilet, and were at 
risk from sanitation- and water-related diseases.”  The devastating cholera outbreak that 
began in October 2010 killed more than 7,000 people and further complicated response 
planning.   
 The WASH Cluster, co-led by UNICEF and La Direction Nationale d’Eau 
Potable et d’Assainissement (DINEPA), was one of the most applauded clusters in Haiti.  
It performed strongly across the three dimensions of leadership, partnership, and 
accountability to the beneficiaries.    
 The first dimension of leadership proved to be highly effective.   From providing 
10.5 tons of chlorine and 45 million water purification tablets to installing and 
maintaining over 11,300 latrines and campsites, UNICEF led the WASH Cluster with 
great success and served as an accountable PoLR.  DINEPA, the GoH regulatory 
authority established in 2009 in charge of reforming Haiti’s water and sanitation system, 
also took charge of the response.  Trevor White, a WASH Technical Advisor for the 
Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID, remarked, “This was an 
international emergency WASH response success.  No other sector in Haiti had a 
government department leading a cluster.  I saw DINEPA create an environment of 
cooperation—and save lives.”  Jay Graham, a USAID Environmental Health Advisor, 
echoed White’s applause, “DINEPA’s personnel are very committed….  I was surprised.  
You hear that the cluster system doesn’t work.  Here is a WASH Cluster response that is 
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effective….  DINEPA places water quality test results and data on-line; they are 
transparent, sensitive to requests from stakeholders, open to criticism and NGO 
challenge, and forthright about sharing contacts.  DINEPA and UNICEF give each 
stakeholder a chance to speak at cluster meetings, and they encourage Haitians to 
participate in the meetings.”  The cohesive leadership allowed for the establishment of 
the following Minimum Standards for Sanitation Operational Principles and Practices in 
Temporary Sites as well as key Cholera Sanitation Response activities: 
• 1 toilet per 50 persons 
• 1 shower per 50 persons 
• Distance to furthest users no more than 50m 
• 1 handwashing station per 5 toilets 
• 1 to 5 toilets for disabled persons 
• Guaranteed basic sanitation (including drainage) 
• Daily disinfection of latrines (especially slabs, seats, and panels) 
• Desludging guaranteed by a company approved by DINEPA/WASH Cluster and 
done on sites with DINEPA authorization. 
Operational support, however, remained an area of concern for leadership and 
accountability. White reported, “All responders were working 20-hour days under serious 
stress.”  Shepherd-Barron elaborated that while other units and sections “were housed in 
air-conditioned containerized accommodation well in advance,” “the WASH Cluster 
coordination team was housed in a sweltering tent where daytime temperatures hovered 
in the low forties centigrade until the second week of July (i.e. 25 weeks after [the] onset 
of [the] disaster).”  In addition, inadequate technology—“cheap mobile phones whose 
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credit regularly expired”—and inefficient transportation—“with an average of three 
hours per day spent in a vehicle traveling either to or from DINEPA or visiting partners 
in the field”—provided to the Cluster Coordinator raised efficiency issues (Shepherd-
Barron).  Altogether, the poor connectivity, transport, and working environment reduced 
functionality of the WASH Cluster coordination team. 
 As for accountability among the humanitarian actors, Shepherd-Barron noted that 
“in Haiti, only 23 of the 52 organizations provided regular activity reports to the Cluster 
format, with the others requiring constant follow-up.”  Despite the need for follow-up and 
lack of knowledge as result of inadequate information-sharing, the active leadership 
assisted greatly to make the WASH Cluster system a collective effort. 
  Regarding the second dimension of partnerships, the Haiti WASH Cluster 
demonstrated the cluster approach’s ability to bring together different actors across the 
public and private sectors and to forge effective working relationships.  UNICEF and 
other WASH members worked together with municipal authorities and the National 
Direction for Potable Water and Sanitation (DINEPA).  “At the height of the emergency, 
UNICEF and its partners were trucking a daily average of 8.3 million liters of clean water 
to close to 60,000 people—the equivalent of a line of trucks the length of 160 football 
pitches” (UNICEF).  Beyond construction and water purification projects, agencies 
mobilized staff to organize hygiene promotion activities and to distribute hygiene kits in 
communities.  In the cholera response, the WASH Cluster trained 4,500 new hygiene 
promoters, engaging religious leaders, government, NGO networks, and global tools.  
The WASH Cluster also worked together with schools to promote hygiene and keep 
water-borne diseases at bay.  UNICEF and DINEPA actively developed partnerships—
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they gathered 77 organizations to organize the Global Handwashing Day on October 15, 
2010, a massive grassroots effort that impacted over 709,000 people (UNICEF).  The 
following figure illustrates the expansion of Global Handwashing Day in Haiti from 2010 
to 2011.  
Figure 7. Haiti Nutrition Cluster Global Handwashing Day Data 2010-2011 
 
As for the third dimension, the WASH Cluster positively impacted and engaged 
the local population.  UNICEF, DINEPA, cluster members, and partners delivered critical 
supplies and services in a timely manner under the effective co-leadership of UNICEF 
and DINEPA.  Graham remarked, “The cluster works fast; test results show improved 
water quality.”  Within two to three days of testing wells and approving good sources, 
DINEPA “established a fleet of privately owned chlorinated water tankers, fuel reserves, 
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and a delivery system” (Trevor).  An initial inefficiency existed in the water delivery 
process, but DINEPA coordinated with NGOs, who then set up water bladders and tap 
stands and eliminated the queues.  The following table traces the WASH Cluster’s targets 
and achievements in 2010. 
Figure 8. Haiti WASH Cluster Targets and Progress in 2010 
 
Within one year, “approximately 1.72 million people have benefited from water and 
sanitation assistance including safe drinking water, latrines, bathing facilities, and NFIs, 
as well as the removal of solid waste and the provision of appropriate drainage” 
(UNICEF).  The early establishment of the water delivery system and its success can be 
attributed in part to UNICEF and DINEPA’s active inclusion of the beneficiaries at 
cluster meetings.  Throughout the recovery phase process, the WASH Cluster identified 
local authorities, community-based organizations, and community leaders as critical 
partners.  Leaders of groups of women in the camps and neighborhoods were engaged to 
help with planning and monitoring and to ensure the appropriation and sustainability of 
the sanitation response.  The local population’s satisfaction was evident; they made few 
complaints regarding water.  Moreover, in the recovery plan for the WASH Cluster, 
UNICEF and DINEPA endeavored to “put communities in the driver’s seat” and promote 
community ownership of the response through transitioning the responsibility toward the 
community.  Its plans for Community-Led Total Sanitation and adoption of the “Strategie 
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Quartier” principle demonstrated the WASH Cluster’s view toward the long-term 
sustainability of relief efforts through the incorporation of the affected population.11 
  The following table summarizes the achievements of the Haiti WASH Cluster 
along the three dimensions. 
Figure 9. Haiti WASH Cluster Evaluation 
Haiti WASH Cluster 
Overall Performance: Effective 
Leadership and 
Accountability 
Partnership Impact on Population 
Effective 
• Active cluster co-leads 
UNICEF and DINEPA 
• Minimum Standards for 
Sanitation Operational 
Principles & Practices 
established 
• Poor operational support 
• Information-sharing by 
cluster members needs 
improvement 
Effective 
• Strong cluster-government 
co-leadership 
• Partnership with 77 
organizations for Global 
Handwashing Day in 2010 
• Worked with schools to 
promote good practices 
• Effective activation of 
NGOs 
Effective 
• Latrines and campsites set 
up and maintained 
• Water purification 
• Community needs met 
• Community invited to 
participate in cluster 
meetings 





Assessment of Haiti 
  In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and the first year of operations, 
considerable achievements were accomplished within the cluster system, and key 
challenges were identified.  ALNAP reported, “Overall targets across all sectors for the 
first six months of the emergency response operation were met.”  The 2010 IASC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The principle of “Strategie Quartier” aims to facilitate a holistic return of camp populations to 




Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti identifies the following achievements 
across the clusters: 
• 4 million people have received food. 
• 1.2 million people have access to safe water daily. 
• 1.5 million people have received emergency shelter materials. 
• 2.1 million household Non-Food Items (NFIs) have been distributed. 
• 11,000 latrines have been installed. 
• 90% of internally displaced persons in Port-au-Prince have access to adjacent 
health clinics. 
• 195,000 children have benefited from temporary learning spaces. 
• 550,000 children and pregnant/lactating women have received supplementary 
feeding. 
• 1 million people have benefited from Cash-for-Work programs. 
• 5,900 people have been relocated from imminently dangerous locations. 
• 142,000 households have received agricultural inputs for spring planting. 
• 2,047 separated children have been registered and 337 reunited with their 
families. 
Significant challenges encumbered the cluster system in Haiti.  The major 
roadblock revolved around the absence of the government.  Decision-makers “who would 
normally be expected to lead and manage the response were themselves victims of the 
earthquake” (ALNAP).  Debris and infrastructural damage obstructed aid, and the private 
sector received a hefty blow, reducing its capacity to assist with rebuilding livelihoods.  
The cluster system also had to accommodate the hundreds of aid agencies overwhelming 
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the coordination structure.  The tendency to use English created another problem for 
coordination, as this excluded the French- and Creole-speaking national and local 
authorities.  In general (with the exception of the WASH Cluster), aid agencies 
overlooked national and local capacities and existing guidelines and methodologies under 
the pressure of the high-profile, large-scale emergency.  Clearly, the response to the Haiti 
earthquake was burdened with much inefficiency. 
Due to efforts made by the national authorities and the humanitarian community 
throughout 2010 and 2011, the humanitarian situation in Haiti has improved.  “The 
number of people living in camps has decreased by approximately 63% from 1.5 million 
in July 2010 to 550,560 in September 2011” (Haiti 2012 Consolidated Appeal).  The 
GoH, now stronger, chairs or co-leads a majority of the clusters.  However, the context 
has changed as needs have evolved, different actors are at the helm of response and 
coordination, and new issues have risen.      
  
MYANMAR 
“On 2 and 3 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Myanmar, leaving 
behind a trail of unprecedented destruction in the Ayeyarwady Delta and 
southern Yangon Division. This natural disaster, the worst in Myanmar history, 
was responsible for the loss of 138,000 lives, wide-spread destruction, shattering 
livelihoods for 2.4 million people and the breakdown of economic activities and 
social conditions.” 
 





  Before examining the response to Cyclone Nargis, it is important to understand 
the country of Myanmar.  Myanmar is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia.  It 
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spans over 676,578 square kilometers of land, upon which 51.5 million people resided in 
2007.  The OCHA Flash Appeal provides a consolidated country profile. 
Figure 10. Myanmar Country Profile 
 
  
  Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on May 2 and 3, 2008, landing in the 
Ayeyarwady Division, sweeping through the Yangon Division, and affecting over 50 
townships.  The category 3 cyclone, which drew wind speeds that reached 200 kilometers 
per hour, and the accompanying heavy rain inflicted severe damage throughout 
Myanmar, particularly in the Ayeyarwady Delta, which was struck by a 12-foot storm 




Figure 11. Cyclone Nargis: Most Affected Areas by % of Population and Area
 
  “Nargis was the worst natural disaster in the history of Myanmar, and the most 
devastating cyclone to strike Asia since 1991,” concludes the Tripartite Core Group 
(TCG) in the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment.12  The unprecedented scale and magnitude of 
Cyclone Nargis overwhelmed the country despite its historical experience with small to 
medium-scale natural disasters, such as fires in the dry season and tropical storms in the 
monsoon season.13  As of June 24, 2008, “the official death toll stood at 843,537 with 
53,836 people still missing, and 19,359 injured” (TCG).  In the widespread devastation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 On May 25, 2008, at the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference organized in the 
aftermath of the cyclone in Yangon, agreement was reached to form a Tripartite Core Group 
(TCG) to coordinate relief efforts, bringing together the Government of the Union of Myanmar, 
the United Nations, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
13 Historical data indicate that between 1996-2005, urban fires constituted about 70 percent of 
disaster events, followed by floods (11 percent), storms (10 percent) and others (9 percent) 
including earthquakes, tsunamis and landslides. Between 1910 and 2000, there were at least 14 
major windstorms, 6 earthquakes, and 12 major floods. 
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over 800,000 were displaced, and over 14.3% of the country’s population was directly 
impacted based on the estimate of 7.35 million people affected by Nargis.  The following 
table from the OCHA Flash Appeal documents the impact by geographical division. 
Figure 12. Cyclone Nargis: Impact by Geographical Divisions 
 
 As evidenced by data from the UNOSAT maps, Nargis impacted the low-lying 
region of the Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions most severely.  The devastation 
destroyed fertile fields, shelter, and water and sanitation systems as well as power and 
communication lines.  Torn trees, debris, and flooding blocked vital roads, and the storm 
surge destroyed significant stocks of dry-season crop in the Delta region, which 
“accounts for about 25 percent of the annual production in the affected area” (TCG).  The 
cyclone disrupted not only the livelihoods of the agrarian families, which account for 50 
to 60 percent of the population in the Delta region, but also raised crop prices throughout 
the country and placed vulnerable groups at a greater risk of exploitation and violence.  
Vulnerable persons include women, children, elderly, the landless, and the chronically 
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sick or disabled (TCG).  The following table provides estimates of the agricultural losses 
throughout Myanmar. 
Figure 13. Cyclone Nargis: Estimates of Damage and Losses in the Agriculture Sector 
(in Kyats million) 
 
 In the aftermath of the disaster, the Government of the Union of Myanmar  
(GoUM), Tatmadaw armed forces, civil society, the business community, ASEAN, UN 
agencies, and NGOs carried out a massive recovery effort.  Immediately following the 
arrival of Cyclone Nargis, the National Natural Disaster Preparedness Central Committee 
(NDPCC) convened the morning of May 3, 2008, and formed ten Emergency Disaster 
Response Subcommittees with respective implementation plans (TCG).14  The ten 
subcommittees overseen by individual ministers covered News and Information, 
Emergency Communication, Search and Rescue, Assessment and Emergency Relief, 
Confirmation of Loss and Damage, Transportation and Route Clearance, Natural Disaster 
Reduction and Emergency Shelter Provision, Healthcare, Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction, and Security.  The GoUM, operating from the Yangon office, acted 
decisively and efficiently, earmarking USD 45.45 million for disaster relief and 
activating emergency relief and rehabilitation efforts.  Its priorities included rebuilding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The NDPCC, chaired by the Prime Minister General Thein Sein, was established by the GoUM 
after the 2004 Asian Tsunami experience. 
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houses and public infrastructure, resettling homeless persons, restoring electricity and 
communication, rehabilitating drinking water sources and rice mills, and resuscitating 
agricultural and urban industries (TCG).  With the support of infantry servicemen from 
the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces, “reinstallation of electricity and water, and 
renovation of hospitals were completed within 4 days in Yangon Division which restored 
33 townships back to normalcy,” and “the Yangon Division Peace and Development 
Council was able to restore food and drinking water supplies within 7 days” (TCG).  The 
Myanmar Navy and Air Force were also activated.  Military truck fleets delivered 
essential supplies ranging from relief goods to water buffalos, and doctors and nurses 
from the Defense Services Medical Corps administered emergency care services.  
380,529 persons benefited from 419 relief camps set up by the GoUM across 29 
townships in the Yangon and Ayeyarwady Divisions (TCG).  The NDPCC then created a 
four-phase plan to redevelop destroyed townships and to establish preparedness 
mechanisms for future natural disasters.  The Tatmadaw assisted the GoUM in mitigating 
public panic and maintaining peace by providing security. 
 The Burmese people and business community assisted fellow compatriots.  The 
former generously shared cash, food, and household supplies that were not swept away 
by Nargis, while the latter provided assistance in their particular areas of competence.  
For example, engineering and construction firms contributed their manpower, equipment, 
and expertise and worked closely with government authority and township leaders to 
rebuild the physical infrastructure.  Both secular and non-secular organizations disbursed 
sizable quantities of cash and relief materials.  Also, Burmese living outside the country 
organized collections and returned to Myanmar to assist with the relief effort.  “The 
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recorded contributions in cash and kind from Myanmar nationals reached a total 
of…about USD 11.86 million” by June 24, 2008 (TCG).  The generous and voluntary 
assistance on the part of civilians, local organizations, and the business community 
helped alleviate starvation and disease and ensure the timely delivery of aid.  
 On a regional and international level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) played a large role in the humanitarian response.  The following table 
documents the assistance provided by ASEAN member states as of July 11, 2008. 
Figure 14. ASEAN Member States’ Assistance to Cyclone Nargis (as of 11 July 2008) 
 
ASEAN also partnered with various UN agencies to coordinate the international 
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response.  One week into the disaster from May 9-18, 2008, ASEAN deployed its 
Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), through which foreign ministers 
established ASEAN’s role in Myanmar: “to facilitate effective distribution and utilization 
of assistance for the international community, including expeditious and effective 
deployment of relief workers, especially health and medical personnel” (TCG).  In other 
words, ASEAN served as a critical pivot that created an environment in which a GoUM-
ASEAN-UN partnership could materialize in the form of the nine-member Tripartite 
Core Group (TCG) and enabled international aid to reach the affected population.  The 
following figure illustrates the ASEAN-led coordination mechanism. 
Figure 15. Tripartite Core Group 
 
In addition to setting up the TCG, ASEAN foreign ministers created the ASEAN 
Humanitarian Task Force for the Victims of the Cyclone Nargis (AHTF), overseen by 
ASEAN Secretary-General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan.  On May 25, 2008, the ASEAN-United 
Nations International Pledging Conference in Yangon formalized the collaboration 
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among the GoUM, 51 countries, 24 UN agencies, the World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, and NGOs “with unanimous agreement on the need to urgently scale up relief 
efforts,” which ultimately resulted in the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (TCG).  
 
Nutrition Cluster 
 Prior to Cyclone Nargis, the Burmese population experienced nutrition and food 
security issues not because of deficient food production, but due to severe weather 
conditions and adverse government-controlled economic policies that exported food 
needed by the Burmese.  As a result, malnutrition posed a significant public health 
problem, particularly in micronutrient deficiencies of vitamin A, iodine, and iron.  
UNICEF reported that in 2008, Myanmar had 1,880,000 stunted children under the age of 
five and ranked 18th out of 136 countries in stunting.  The following table shows a pre-
disaster nutritional overview of Myanmar. 
Figure 16. Myanmar: Pre-Nargis Nutritional Status 
 
  Nargis aggravated nutrition security in Myanmar, as evidenced in the Village 
Tract Assessment (VTA) survey the TCG carried out immediately following the cyclone 
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to identify immediate relief and early recovery priorities across the affected areas.  A 
majority of households in the Delta region struggled to meet their basic daily food needs.  
VTA results report, “42 percent of households lost all their food stocks during the 
cyclone, with another 33 percent losing most or some of their stocks” (TCG). The 
following chart details the availability of food stock in the Delta reported on the day of 
the survey. 
Figure 17. Availability of Food Stock as Reported by Households in the Delta 
 
Also, VTA results show that out of the basic necessities, surveyed households prioritized 
food most highly.  According to the following graph, 89% of surveyed households placed 




Figure 18. Priority Expenditures as Ranked by Households in the Delta
 
 On the international front, the Nutrition Cluster formed before Cyclone Nargis 
even struck Myanmar.  From the drafting of the cluster contingency plan in April 2008 to 
mid-June 2009 after Cyclone Nargis, the Nutrition Cluster remained fully operational.  
UNICEF served as the cluster lead, and three working groups chaired by different 
organizations existed within the cluster.  These include Nutrition Surveillance, Infant 
Feeding in Emergency (IFE), and Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition 
(CMAM), which were chaired respectively by UNICEF, Save the Children, and ACF.  
Notably, the National Nutrition Centre of the Ministry of Health, a GoUM entity, co-led 
the robust Nutrition Cluster, and “Technical Medical Officers (TMO) acted as field 
coordinators supported by UNICEF field nutrition staff”  (GPPI-URD).  The IASC 
response summary lists the work of the Nutrition Cluster as one of the achievements in 
the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.  Nutrition support sustained 31,600 malnourished 
children, and “1,100,000 people [received] food aid” (GPPI-URD).  Based on the UN 
Country Team’s (UNCT) plans of assisting a “minimum of 1,500,000 persons for at least 
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three months,” the Nutrition Cluster achieved 73% of its initial goal in reaching out to 
1,100,000 persons (OCHA Myanmar Flash).   
  The table below summarizes the Nutrition Cluster’s strengths in the areas of 
accountability, leadership, and partnership, particularly with the GoUM, and its relative 
weakness in maintaining accountability to the affected population. 
 




First, strong leadership and accountability were evident in the presence of training 
and technical advice groups, additionally deployed surge personnel, GenCap and ProCap 
advisors, and global cluster coordinators conducting on-site visits.  Their vigorous 
leadership provided critical human resource expertise and coordination.  In particular, the 
active and dedicated global cluster coordinators “led to technical exchanges over the 
latest treatment techniques for acute and moderate malnutrition” as a result of their clear 
designation and the establishment of the Terms of Reference (GPPI-URD).  One should 
note, however, that although the Terms of Reference for country-level cluster leads 
endorses participatory and community-based approaches, “there has been little focus on 
monitoring and improving downward accountability mechanisms within the framework 
of the humanitarian reforms,” according to the Review of the engagement of NGOs with 
the humanitarian reform process.  
Second, a robust partnership between the Nutrition Cluster and the GoUM 
promoted accountability between cluster members.  The GoUM co-chaired at the national 
level and at the township level.  In response to the aggravated malnutrition situation, the 
GoUM, acting through the Ministry of Health and the National Nutrition Center, 
collaborated on multiple fronts with a broad range of agencies from UN agencies to 
international and local NGOs.  With the GoUM playing an active role in facilitation, 
communication networks were opened, allowing for information exchange, which helped 
develop strong informal accountability among the many humanitarian organizations.  
Working in collaboration with the GoUM at national-level cluster meetings and special 
meetings, the Nutrition Cluster helped develop national policy—guidelines for the 
treatment of moderate acute malnutrition—and achieved government authorization.  
 	  
71	  
Cluster work plans emerged from productive meetings in which cluster members agreed 
upon action points and “assigned responsibilities for activities to specific organizations” 
(GPPI-URD).  Due to the overall cohesiveness within the Nutrition Cluster, cluster 
members commonly expressed in the Nutrition Cluster overview and proposed transition 
strategy, “Nutrition Cluster has achieved mutual accountability between UN, non-UN and 
government as well in the areas of response where agencies have made commitments” 
(GPPI-URD).   
  Third, the Nutrition Cluster’s success can be seen in the reduction of outstanding 
gaps, but engagement of the local population remained inadequate.  According to the 
World Food Programme, “17,000 megatons of food commodities had been delivered to 
730,000 beneficiaries in the Delta,” and “an additional 50,000 beneficiaries received cash 
transfer for food commodities in Yangon local markets.”  UNICEF distributed “more 
than 200 tons of ready-to-use therapeutic food (RTF)” to partners in the field (TCG).  
Together, UNICEF and the Ministry of Health established 4 hospital therapeutic feeding 
units and trained workers in targeted feeding for children.  The VTA further illustrates 
the significance of humanitarian aid; 51% of the households report receiving food from 
humanitarian agencies, while 54% sourced food from local markets.  Many households 
were dependent upon multiple food sources because Cyclone Nargis compounded pre-
existing food access issues.  The following pie chart provides a graphical representation 






Figure 20. Sources of Food as Reported by Households in the Delta 
 
Periodic Review III, sponsored by TCG, provided insight eighteen months into the 
disaster from October 21 to November 17, 2009.  The first of the two following maps 
shows the ongoing moderate to severe food insecurity in 2009, and the second map 
shows the level of acute malnutrition across Myanmar during that time. 
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Figure 22. Myanmar Levels of Acute Malnutrition in 2009 
  
 
Although the Nutrition Cluster reduced outstanding gaps, information-sharing and 
engagement of affected populations required greater attention.  From the Social Impacts 
Monitorings carried out in November 2008, the following conclusions were drawn: 
“communities often did not know who was giving them assistance,” “communities did 
not know how or to whom to complain and the consequences of complaining,” and 
information was disseminated “almost exclusively in English” at the Yangon level, 
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inhibiting local participation.  The Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) 
elaborates that the cluster would forward complaints from the community to concerned 
agencies instead of following up on the complaints.  Indeed, the Nutrition Cluster found 
“accountability to beneficiaries [to be] the weakest area, which needs greater attention 
through clusters” (GPPI-URD).  To address the accountability gap, the RTE report 
recommends outreach activities to garner feedback from local stakeholders and to verify 
Who, What, Where (3W) information by cluster and by area.15  
 Outstanding gaps remained after the Nutrition Cluster closed in June 2009.  
Although 45% of the surveyed households—mainly in the southern regions along 
Nargis’s path—received food assistance, food insecurity remained a concern around the 
loci of Pyapon and Bogale.  Also, the concentration of assistance in the more affected 
areas created a nutritional imbalance, with children’s nourishment weakest outside the 
most affected areas, as evidenced by the higher rate of malnutrition in the Pathein 
division in the map above.  While the community continued to slowly wean off of food 
aid, the focus had shifted from food and nutrition to livelihood recovery.  
 The table below summarizes the performance of Myanmar’s Nutrition Cluster 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU) employed the 3W coordination tool and 




Figure 23. Myanmar Nutrition Cluster Evaluation 
Myanmar Nutrition Cluster 
Overall Performance: Effective 
Leadership and 
Accountability 
Partnership Impact on Population 
Effective 
• Training and technical 
advice groups available 
• Active global cluster 
coordinators 
• Informal accountability 
• ToR established 
• Downward accountability 
needs greater attention 
Effective 
• Co-facilitation by GoUM 
and cluster  
• Cluster collaborated in 
developing national policy 
• Open communication 
• Information-sharing needs 
greater attention 
Adequate 
• Beneficiaries excluded in 
response planning 
• Beneficiaries uninformed 
• Food commodities 
delivered and feeding 
units built 
• Program for cash transfer 




 Cyclone Nargis also aggravated water and sanitation and health issues in 
Myanmar.  Before Cyclone Nargis struck, rural communities amassed their water supply 
by harvesting rainwater in tanks, communal rainwater ponds and wells.  The following 
graphs prepared by UNICEF show greater use of improved drinking water sources in 
rural Myanmar than in urban areas, but a slightly greater percentage of urban residents 










Figure 24. Myanmar: Pre-Nargis Water and Sanitation 
 
  The cyclone and ensuing flooding “damaged close to 13% of ponds in Yangon 
and up to 43% of ponds in Ayeyarwady Division” (TCG).  The following table illustrates 
the varying availability of the water sources before and after the cyclone salinized potable 
water sources. 






In terms of damages and losses in the water supply sector, the following table shows a 
total of 8,516,000,000 Kyats in damage and loss in the water supply sector. 
Figure 26. Damage and Loss Estimates in the Water Supply Sector (Kyats million) 
 
 
The flooding demolished most latrines that existed in a majority of communities in the 
Yangon and Ayeyarwady Divisions before Cyclone Nargis struck.  As a result, “the 
proportion of households practicing unsanitary defecation—open defecation, floating 
latrines or trenches—almost doubled to 40%” (TCG).  Furthermore, households relying 
on river water as a drinking water source faced serious health risks, particularly with the 
greater use of floating latrines.  Despite the contamination of the water and living 
conditions in the camps, the World Health Organization reported no serious peak in 
diarrhea.  The WASH Cluster responded by supplying 800,000 liters of water per day to 
250,000 persons through 29 water treatment plants and rehabilitating 250 ponds (TCG). 
  Unlike the Nutrition Cluster, the WASH Cluster was activated directly after 
Cyclone Nargis hit and closed a year later in June 2009.  Coordination took place at the 
national level and township levels by the cluster lead UNICEF.  The figure below shows 







Figure 27. Myanmar WASH Cluster Approach Evaluation 
 
These findings reflect weaknesses across the three dimensions—in the predictability and 
accountability of leadership and ownership, in deficient cohesiveness in partnerships, and 
in gaps that emerged from government restrictions and the missing local voice. 
First, the WASH Cluster demonstrated poor leadership and accountability.  
Findings from the May 2009 review of the Global WASH Learning Project reflect this.  
In the first finding, cluster members expressed concern with UNICEF’s capacity to lead 
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the cluster and implement work plans.  Humanitarian actors strongly questioned the role 
of UNICEF as lead agency for the WASH Cluster.  Typically, UN agencies oversee the 
coordination, and implementing partners handle the operations.  UNICEF’s role as a 
direct project implementer raised concerns because cluster members doubted its capacity 
to manage both coordination and implementation.  In the second finding, cluster members 
desired additional support from the global level, especially as tensions arose between 
cluster members and the cluster lead UNICEF regarding funding issues.  The following 
figure shows that the percentage of funding exceeded the percentage of requirements by 
7% for the lead agency UNICEF, which may be the root of the funding dissension.  
 
Figure 28. Distribution of Revised Flash Appeal Requirements and Funding per 




Second, the WASH Cluster did not embrace participatory and collaborative 
approaches.  The Phase II country report for Myanmar elaborates further on this aspect of 
the WASH Cluster.  Regarding cluster support, global clusters provided national clusters 
with beneficial guidelines, policies, and handbooks; however, these tools were poorly 
adapted to local needs at times due to the insufficient inclusion of local persons in cluster 
meetings.  On one hand, prompt support from the cluster coordinator expedited recovery.  
For example, the WASH Global Cluster Rapid Response Team contributed an expert 
staffer to help support cluster members in managing water scarcity.  On the other hand, 
the timeliness of the support provided by the global clusters received criticism.  Cluster 
members received the WASH Cluster Coordination Handbook after the cluster had 
finished its work, and the expert staffer assigned to help manage the water scarcity crisis 
also arrived belatedly.  Most alarmingly, knowledge from the global clusters did not 
funnel beyond the national level, and the local level suffered from the lack of 
communication.  Furthermore, decision-making at the field level was hindered by the fact 
that “the actual number of decision-making (and technically knowledgeable) 
representatives who were present during these meetings [were] actually low” (WASH 
Cluster evaluator).   
 Third, the local population was not adequately engaged, and outstanding gaps 
remained.  The Periodic Review III from October to November 2009 paints the post-
cluster WASH situation.  As shown by the following map, the red patches in Pyapon and 
in scattered patches in the most affected areas reveal an uneven distribution of improved 
sanitation facilities.  Although a greater number of households had access to improved 
 	  
82	  
sanitation facilities, 43% of the overall population still expressed sanitation facilities were 
their most pressing need. 
Figure 29. Myanmar Distribution of Improved Sanitation Facilities 
 
 
Water, on the other hand, seemed to be less of a focus for the population.  Only 7% of the 
overall population listed water as a priority, and most of these were concentrated in the 




Figure 30. Myanmar Water Supply 
 
  
 It is important to note the developing gap between the most affected and less affected 
regions.  The following figures showcase latrines received, hygiene items received, and 






Figure 31. Myanmar Latrines Received 
         
         Figure 33. Myanmar Hygiene   




The following table summarizes the Myanmar WASH Cluster performance across 
the three dimensions. 
Figure 34. Myanmar WASH Cluster Evaluation 
Myanmar WASH Cluster 
Overall Performance: Ineffective 
Leadership and 
Accountability 
Partnership Impact on Population 
Ineffective 
• Cluster members 
questioned capacity of 
cluster lead UNICEF  
• Absent decision-makers 
• Timeliness detrimental to 
operationalization of tools 
and guidelines 
Ineffective 
• Knowledge funneled from 
global to national-level  
• Lack of communication to 
local level 
• Low attendance at cluster 
meetings 
• Handbooks and tools 
poorly adapted to local 
needs 
Ineffective 
• Uneven distribution of 
sanitation facilities 
• Beneficiaries excluded in 
response planning 
• Beneficiaries uninformed 
• Aid concentration in most-





Assessment of Myanmar 
Cyclone Nargis left a fatal path of destruction in Myanmar and produced an 
estimated total of USD 4,057 million in damages to physical assets and economic 
decline.  The magnitude of the disaster is delineated by the fact that “the value of damage 
and losses is equivalent to 21 percent of the country’s gross domestic product” of the 
2007 fiscal year (TCG).  The following table provides an overall summary of the damage 







Figure 35. Cyclone Nargis: Overall Summary of Damage and Losses
 
In preparation for the phasing out of the emergency cluster system in June 2009, 
the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) was launched in February 
2009.  The three-year recovery plan incorporated the effective cluster coordination 
mechanism by consolidating the cluster areas into three Delta Working Groups: Basic 
Services (health, water, sanitation and hygiene, education, nutrition), Livelihood 
(livelihood, food security), and Social and Physical Protection (protection of vulnerable 







 Important insight into humanitarian coordination and response may be gleaned 
from comparing Haiti and Myanmar.  After a pre-disaster country analysis and study of 
the early response at the onset of the disasters, this section examines the following four 
comparisons of the cluster approach as employed in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters in 
the two countries. 
• Haiti WASH Cluster and Myanmar WASH Cluster 
• Haiti Nutrition Cluster and Myanmar Nutrition Cluster 
• Haiti WASH Cluster and Haiti Nutrition Cluster 
• Myanmar WASH Cluster and Myanmar Nutrition Cluster. 
 
PRE-DISASTER AND EARLY RESPONSE COUNTRY COMPARISON 
  To better understand the rollout of the clusters, one must first study Haiti’s and 
Myanmar’s situation before the disaster took place and the situation at the onset of the 
disaster to identify the constraints and opportunities that enabled the various actors to 
evolve into their eventual roles.   
One must examine Haiti’s and Myanmar’s respective political and economic 
environment during the onset of the crises for a better understanding of the situational 
constraints that can potentially impede aid efforts.  Haiti, the poorest nation in the 
Western Hemisphere with 80% of the population living below the poverty line, struggles 
with insufficient investment, infrastructure, and security (IRIN).  Haiti overcame Spanish 
and French colonial oppression and entered a precarious semi-presidential republic in 
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1987, whereas Myanmar struggled with poverty, corruption, and ethnic conflict flamed 
by pervasive government controls under the authoritarian military junta.  Despite its 
wealth of natural resources, Myanmar’s economy is severely stunted by military-run 
enterprises monopolizing key industries and a black-market-driven economy (IRIN).  
Clearly, the social and economic challenges in Haiti and in Myanmar limited the capacity 
for state leadership and citizens to develop and implement disaster preparedness 
initiatives.  Periodic man-made disasters and smaller-scale natural disasters in both 
countries may have equipped the government with certain tools and mechanisms and the 
people with the mentality to persevere; however, no experience could have prepared 
either country for disasters on the order of a 7.0 earthquake or a category 3 cyclone.  
Both countries depended on international aid, but while the GoH welcomed the 
UN, foreign military units, and NGOs, the GoUM strongly resisted foreign assistance at 
the onset of the disaster.  The GoH’s receptiveness to international aid and expedited 
activation of the cluster system reflect several key acknowledgements.  First, the GoH 
established disaster response as the nation’s priority.  Second, the government recognized 
its inability to lead and coordinate the response.  Third, the GoH acknowledged the 
capability of the NGOs present in the country.  Finally, in reactivating the cluster system, 
the GoH demonstrated its confidence in the previous clusters rolled out in response to the 
tropical storms and hurricanes of 2008.  The GPPI-URD cluster evaluation of the 2008 
tropical storms and hurricanes remarks that the cluster approach improved coordination, 
partnership, information-sharing, and leadership predictability.   
On the other hand, the GoUM sought international aid selectively.  The 
isolationist military regime refused to grant Western agencies access into Myanmar even 
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as the delay in relief efforts resulted in more and more casualties.  At the onset of the 
disaster, the military junta seized UN food aid, denied humanitarian workers visas, and 
deported Westerners from checkpoints throughout the Delta region.  Specifically, the 
GoUM refused to admit French and American naval vessels and military planes carrying 
relief supplies based on the argument that these were war machines being used for 
gunboat diplomacy.  The Burmese government’s initial response is reflective of the 
common misconceptions that international NGOs are agents of other governments and 
that foreign governments plot to usurp control over the country via aid.  Initially, the 
GoUM may have believed in its own capacity to rescue its citizens from the crisis 
because of its Tatmadaw military and operational ministries and its National Natural 
Disaster Preparedness Central Committee.  Also, political motivations influenced the 
GoUM, especially with the impending constitutional referendum on May 10, 2008.  The 
military junta was heavily criticized for prioritizing its political agenda over the needs of 
the population.  On one hand, the ruling party sought to manage the crisis and garner 
public favor for the upcoming referendum.  On the other hand, the GoUM wished to 
prevent the international community from witnessing the devastation, criticizing the 
response, and potentially taking action against the ruling party.  Nevertheless, a limited 
number of visas were distributed eventually, and a fraction of the available international 
aid supplies were admitted into the country.  The British Prime Minister remarked, “This 
is inhuman.  We have an intolerable situation created by a natural disaster.  It is being 
made into a man-made catastrophe by…the neglect and the inhuman treatment of the 
Burmese people by a regime that is failing to act and to allow the international 
community to do what it wants to do” (Brown).  Other countries maintained, however, 
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that state sovereignty must not be violated.  In part due to the outcries for the UN to 
invoke the “responsibility to protect” doctrine and to act even without the junta’s consent, 
the resistance was relatively short-lived.  Authorities made gradual concessions as they 
saw the rising death toll and witnessed the deteriorating situation.  When ASEAN stepped 
in as the mediator between the GoUM and the international community, the Burmese 
benefited from the increased aid.   
The respective governments’ attitude and disposition toward foreign aid greatly 
influenced leadership and partnerships and created different coordination challenges 
within the cluster approach.  In Haiti, the open invitation for aid led to the massive influx 
of NGOs, which created an abundance of parallel and sometimes dysfunctional 
coordination mechanisms.  Severely weakened by the earthquake, the GoH could not 
regulate the multitude of actors and aid initiatives.  In contrast, the GoUM rejected 
outside help out of mistrust.  By politicizing aid, the military junta also raised anxiety 
among aid workers and charities, who were concerned that their aid, if distributed 
without supervision, may be coopted for political purposes and handed out at political 
rallies in exchange for votes during the constitutional referendum.  Ultimately, the mutual 
distrust between restrictive governments and the aid community further victimizes the 
disaster-affected population.  Fortuitously in Myanmar’s case, the GoUM cautiously 
opened its borders with ASEAN acting as a buffer.   
  Despite the contextual similarity in Haiti and Myanmar—both impoverished 
countries responded to unprecedentedly massive natural disasters using the cluster 
approach—the immediate assistance, coordination, rollout, progress, and effectiveness 
differed not only between the two countries, but also among clusters within the countries.  
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HAITI WASH AND MYANMAR WASH COMPARED 
 Overall, the Haiti WASH Cluster had a stronger performance than the Myanmar 
WASH Cluster.  In the area of leadership and accountability, UNICEF and GoH served 
as active cluster co-leads in Haiti, and the GoUM acted as a withdrawn facilitator to the 
weak UNICEF cluster lead in Myanmar.  On one hand, the GoH had DINEPA in place, 
which brought into play existing water and sanitation national guidelines and facilitated 
the development of Minimum Standards for Sanitation Operational Principles and 
Practices.  The co-leadership also contributed to a smooth transition for post-cluster 
coordination and response, as the GoH could easily maintain and sustain the relief efforts.  
On the other hand, the largely absent GoUM did not have a water and sanitation-focused 
department that actively engaged with the cluster.  The absence of the GoUM coupled 
with a weak UNICEF cluster lead greatly undermined the effectiveness of the Myanmar 
WASH Cluster.  In the area of partnership, Haiti WASH Cluster co-leads actively sought 
partners and attempted to activate NGOs, while the Myanmar WASH Cluster struggled to 
maintain attendance levels at cluster meetings and to manage communication.  Finally in 
the area of impact on the population, the Haiti WASH Cluster outshined the Myanmar 
WASH Cluster in informing and engaging local populations as well as in meeting their 
needs.  Clearly, the strong co-leadership in the Haiti WASH Cluster galvanized the 
coordination and relief efforts, allowing for an effective response.  A stronger cluster lead 
in the Myanmar WASH Cluster may have improved communication, aid supply, and the 
timeliness of the operationalization of guidance, but the sustainability of the response 




HAITI NUTRITION AND MYANMAR NUTRITION COMPARED 
In contrast to the Haiti WASH Cluster and Myanmar WASH Cluster comparison, 
the Myanmar Nutrition Cluster proved to be more effective than the Haiti Nutrition 
Cluster.  In Myanmar, active global cluster coordinators and global support facilitated 
Nutrition Cluster operations, whereas in Haiti, cluster members questioned the capacity 
of the UNICEF cluster lead, and UNICEF faced staff shortages.  On one hand, the GoUM 
co-facilitated the cluster in Myanmar, and its participation opened communication 
networks.  On the other hand, the involvement of the authoritarian government raised 
concerns on information-sharing and on downward accountability.  In Haiti, the GoH 
played a smaller role in the cluster due to its diminished capacity following the 
earthquake.  Nonetheless, pre-disaster collaboration between the cluster lead UNICEF 
and GoH facilitated the development of a national protocol for the management of 
malnutrition, and cluster members shared information on the cluster website.  Both 
Nutrition Clusters failed to include beneficiaries in the response planning.  In fact, the 
Burmese cited human rights violations in the form of misappropriated aid.  “Military 
trucks delivered rice and oil from international donors for resale in markets,” according to 
representatives of various interest groups in the Post-Nargis Analysis: The Other Side of 
the Story.  In other cases, GoUM authorities or army soldiers would demand “Yes” votes 
from survivors in the national referendum in exchange for aid.  Overall, greater gaps 






HAITI WASH AND HAITI NUTRITION COMPARED 
  Within Haiti, the WASH Cluster outperformed the Nutrition Cluster.  Multiple 
factors accounted for the relatively weaker performance in some clusters.  First, feeble 
humanitarian leadership in the Nutrition Cluster prevented decisive action in the 
extremely time-sensitive situation.  The WASH Cluster benefited from not only a strong 
UNICEF cluster co-lead, but also a strong government cluster co-lead in the form of 
DINEPA.  Second, the lack of a common information management system across the 
regional, national, and international levels contributed to inefficiencies in the Nutrition 
Cluster.  Duplicative efforts and confusion among humanitarian practitioners weakened 
accountability in the Nutrition Cluster, especially since the cluster lead could not play a 
decisive role.  Also, humanitarian practitioners had to divert energy and time away from 
lifesaving missions when inappropriate solutions were put in place following inaccurate 
assessments and when the wrong resources were provided.  Strong partnerships in the 
WASH Cluster prevented these inefficiencies.  Third, participatory approaches were not 
adopted to engage the local population in the Nutrition Cluster, whereas the WASH 
Cluster actively engaged community members in cluster meetings and in post-cluster 
plans.  Despite the fact that UNICEF served as the cluster lead in both clusters, the cluster 









MYANMAR WASH AND MYANMAR NUTRITION COMPARED 
  In the case of Myanmar, the Nutrition Cluster displayed a stronger performance 
than the WASH Cluster.  The effectiveness of the cluster approach in the Nutrition 
Cluster depended upon the co-facilitation by the GoUM, active global cluster 
coordinators, strong global cluster support, and existence of informal accountability 
mechanisms between the humanitarian actors.  In contrast in the WASH Cluster, the 
weak cluster lead, absence of decision-makers, and poor adaptation of global guidance to 
local needs jeopardized the cluster’s effectiveness.  On the partnership front, the Nutrition 
Cluster also fared better than the WASH Cluster, particularly because the WASH Cluster 
failed to channel communication to the local level.  Finally, both the Nutrition Cluster 
and the WASH Cluster excluded beneficiaries in coordination and response planning.  






The experiences of Haiti and Myanmar clearly show the interlinked nature of the 
multiple variables in disaster coordination and response.  All elements need to work in 
concert in order for humanitarian response to have the greatest positive impact on the 
affected populations.  Consider the WASH Cluster in Haiti, where the effective co-
leadership of UNICEF and DINEPA facilitated the development of sanitation standards, 
which cluster members and partners used to promote good hygiene practices and to set up 
latrines and campsites.  The co-leads engaged community leaders, whose local insight 
helped the cluster to improve the response.  Their outreach to schools and to NGOs 
allowed for an efficient response and expedited the transition to the recovery phase.  
Evidently, the strength of the leadership greatly bolstered other variables, leading to a 
positive outcome for the beneficiaries.  The Nutrition Cluster in Myanmar achieved some 
success as well because various effective elements in the response built upon each other.  
Conversely, humanitarian response suffers when one weakness triggers another.  
Myanmar’s WASH Cluster and Haiti’s Nutrition Cluster demonstrate this negative 
trajectory: the weakness of the UNICEF cluster lead raised doubts among cluster 
members, rendering them unable and unwilling to fully support and engage in the cluster 
system.  Without a coordination framework, operational knowledge, or input from the 
affected population, humanitarian actors could not deliver the right aid in a timely 
manner to the right people.  The chart below summarizes the cluster approach’s 
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effectiveness along the three dimensions examined in the four case studies: leadership 
and accountability, partnership, and impact on the population.   




Nutrition Cluster WASH Cluster 
Haiti 
Overall Performance: Ineffective 
• Leadership and Accountability: 
Ineffective 
• Partnership: Adequate 
• Impact on Population: Ineffective 
Overall Performance: Effective 
• Leadership and Accountability: Effective 
• Partnership: Effective 
• Impact on Population: Effective 
Myanmar 
Overall Performance: Effective 
• Leadership and Accountability: 
Effective 
• Partnership: Effective 
• Impact on Population: Adequate 
Overall Performance: Adequate 
• Leadership and Accountability: 
Ineffective 
• Partnership: Ineffective 
• Impact on Population: Ineffective 
 
The four clusters examined in Chapter V reveal four fundamental features of 
humanitarian coordination and response: (1) the positive correlation between sustained 
leadership and coordination, (2) the significance of developing trust and openness 
between actors, (3) the need to involve and support national leadership from the initial 
response, and (4) the amplified efficiency and effectiveness from leveraging 
international, national, and local capacities.   
In light of these insights, the validity of the two hypotheses can be examined.   
 Hypothesis 1: The cluster approach, which has its basis in the argument that 
coordination among the different humanitarian actors is essential to effective 
humanitarian response, helps to surmount the systemic challenges impeding effective 
humanitarian response.  
  Hypothesis 2: In the absence of a working host government, a robust 
international NGO or agency may be able to administer government functions 
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temporarily.  The humanitarian response remains incumbent upon the national 
government—and, to a lesser extent, local NGOs—to reinstitute their services. 
Features 3 and 4 lend support to Hypothesis 1.  If national authorities need to be 
involved and supported in the response from the onset of the disaster, it follows that 
coordination between national authorities and other humanitarian actors must take place.  
In exceptional cases where the government is especially strong, it may not need 
additional support.  Also, in order for international, national, and local capacities to be 
leveraged altogether, some form of coordination must exist.  The following diagram 
illustrates the correlation between Feature 4 and Hypothesis 1. 
Figure 37. Feature 4 Supporting Hypothesis 1
 
Features 2 and 1 raise questions that challenge Hypothesis 1.  By emphasizing the 
importance of trust and openness between actors, Feature 2 downplays the role of 
coordination and proposes that coordination can only occur when actors trust one 
another.  In other words, trust and openness form the basis of an  effective response.   
Figure 38. Feature 2 Reinterpreting Hypothesis 1 
 
Similarly, Feature 1 suggests that either strong sustained leadership or strong 
coordination may directly produce increased response efficiency and effectiveness, as 
shown in the figure below. 
Coordination	   Leverage	  capacities	  across	  levels	   Increased	  response	  ef>iciency	  and	  effectiveness	  
Trust	  and	  openness	  between	  actors	   Coordination	   Increased	  response	  ef>iciency	  and	  effectiveness	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Figure 39. Feature 1 Reinterpreting Hypothesis 1 
 
 Several observations can be made regarding Hypothesis 2 and Features 1 and 3.  
Feature 3 calls upon other actors to support national leadership from the initial response, 
which directly refutes the idea that a robust international NGO or agency may stand in for 
the government.  If a robust international NGO or agency were to temporarily administer 
government functions, it would in effect sideline any existing government capacity.  
According to Feature 3, the NGO or agency should collaborate with the government in 
the response with the goal of building the government’s capacity to administer the 
services. 
  On the other hand, Feature 1 does not necessarily refute Hypothesis 2, but it 
places a caveat on Hypothesis 2.  The leadership turnover from NGO or agency to the 
government, as proposed in Hypothesis 2, contrasts with Feature 1, which calls for 
sustained leadership.  This implies that the leadership turnover proposed in Hypothesis 2 
would negatively impact coordination unless the government has a leadership role to 
begin with.   
In essence, Hypothesis 1 is supported by Features 3 and 4 and challenged by 
Features 1 and 2, while Hypothesis 2 is not supported by any of the features.  In other 
Strong	  sustained	  leadership	  
Increased	  response	  ef>iciency	  and	  effectiveness	  Strong	  coordination	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words, in an environment of trust and openness, strong cluster coordination can empower 
leadership and help leverage the full range of existing capacities, resulting in an effective 
response.  As supported by the Haiti and Myanmar case studies and illustrated in the 
figure below, the humanitarian response needs to integrate the elements of building trust 
and open communication, coordinating and leveraging capacities, and strengthening 
leadership in order for the cluster approach to reach its potential effectiveness.   






Moving forward, important lessons can be drawn from Haiti and Myanmar to 
ensure that disaster response occurs in an environment of trust and openness, that strong 
cluster coordination empowers leadership and leverages existing capacities, and that an 
effective response is achieved. First, the success or failure of relief operations depends 
largely upon the availability and quality of staff.  In the case of Myanmar, restricted 
access into the country meant that the surge capacity was limited to the personnel already 
Strong	  sustained	  leadership	  
Effective	  response	  Leverage	  capacities	  Strong	  coordination	  
Trust	  and	  Openness	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on the ground.16  As for Haiti, the debris-choked roads and reduced local capacity 
decreased the availability of qualified staff.  The most successful instances were those 
where strong cluster coordinators with a team to operationalize the response plan took 
action.  Second, the affected government, civil society, and local private sector should be 
empowered to play a central role in the humanitarian response.  Even the most devastated 
communities and governments retain certain levels of capacities.  The resilience of the 
Haitian and the Burmese civil society in not only rebuilding their own livelihoods but 
also actively assisting one another illustrates the often untapped potential.  Third, 
integration of knowledge from previous disasters, better capacity assessments, and more 
accurate needs assessments of affected populations must be undertaken with a common 
set of standards and methodologies.  A vast reservoir of institutional knowledge from past 
experiences with similar disasters and contexts exists, but it is often overlooked in the 
initial chaos of the disaster and later untapped when coordinators have already created 
new response plans.  OCHA provides the tools to establish an information management 
network, but it is the responsibility of the practitioners on the ground to input the 
information into the databases in a timely manner and to disseminate it in local 
languages.   Similarly, coordination and response often exclude civil society, who is 
actually the most knowledgeable about needs and outstanding gaps.  Effectiveness of the 
response would increase dramatically if these inefficiencies were addressed.   
These core lessons from Haiti and Myanmar all point toward the importance of 
partnerships in disaster coordination and response.  As Benjamin Franklin prescribed, 
“All who think cannot but see there is a sanction like that of religion which binds us in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Surge capacity refers to an agency’s ability to scale up its program in response to needs. 
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partnership in the serious work of the world.”  Though still in its infancy, the cluster 
approach, one of the three pillars of humanitarian reform, holds great promise for disaster 
response and coordination because it embraces and upholds the principle of partnership, 
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